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I. INTRODUCTION
A young man named Roberto1 is walking home from the bus stop in his
hometown of Nuevo Laredo, a border town located in Northern Mexico.
Roberto has just finished a shift at a large maquiladora2 where his meager
salary is just enough to feed and provide modest shelter for his wife and
small child. As Roberto walks down the dusty path to his small home he
is forced off the road by a group of men in a black double-cab pickup
truck with spinners. The men abruptly exit the vehicle and ask Roberto
how his wife, Lupita, and son are doing. Roberto, who has never seen
1. Roberto is a fictional character and the story is a fictional account. Names, characters,
businesses, places, events and incidents are either the product of the author’s imagination or used in a
fictitious manner. Any resemblances to actual persons, living or dead, or actual events are purely
coincidental.
2. A maquiladora is the Spanish word for a manufacturing plant that takes advantage of
decreased costs through export and import labor to decrease costs under a “value-added” basis.
Maquiladora, ENCY. BRITANNICA (2017).
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these men before, briefly wonders how the men know about his family
before nervously stating he does not want any trouble and politely
attempting to excuse himself from their presence. The men flash pistols
and inform Roberto that he must follow their instructions if he wants his
family to live. Roberto must meet them in two days at an abandoned
house located several miles outside the town. He must also keep this
encounter to himself, or else suffer the consequences. The men drive
away, leaving Roberto wondering how he could possibly protect his family.
With no confidence in the police force and no place to hide, Roberto
follows the men’s instructions. When Roberto arrives at the abandoned
house he is met by a large group of men holding what appear to be
automatic rifles. Inside the house, the smell of marijuana permeates the
air. Roberto observes book-sized packages wrapped in duct tape being
loaded into cheap backpacks by three men that look scared and dispirited.
Roberto is given a backpack and instructed to pack it with as many
bundles as will fit inside. Roberto and the other “mules” are then marched
to the edge of the Rio Grande River and instructed to cross to the other
side where they are to be met by someone who will provide further
instructions. Roberto and the men do as they are told and cross the river.
Within an hour, Roberto is apprehended by the United States Border
Patrol and charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance.
Based on the facts above, Roberto will have an excellent defense of
duress. Or will he? Will the prosecutor buy his story and decline to
prosecute? Does Roberto’s fact scenario meet the elements the United
States Supreme Court has determined are necessary to present a duress
defense? Will a jury believe Roberto when presented with hard evidence
and testimony from a U.S. agent stating that Roberto is responsible for
bringing drugs into the United States?
Roberto has several options as his case proceeds through the criminal
justice system: (1) he can plead guilty and ask for mercy from the court;3
(2) he can present the story to the prosecutor and hope for use of
prosecutorial discretion; or (3) he can plead not guilty, go to trial and
attempt to present a duress defense to a jury.4 Is the duress defense usable
3. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1) (“A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or (with the court’s
consent) nolo contendere.”).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (delineating an individual’s right to a speedy trial by a jury of his
or her peers).
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in this situation, and if not, what other options are available for Roberto in
the alternative? This question will be explored below.
In Part II, a history of the Mexican drug cartels’ evolution into
transnational criminal organizations (“TCOs”) is presented.5 The Mexican
cartels’ business model of plata o plomo is also discussed, along with the
theory that the business model is so effective that individuals such as
Roberto have no choice but to comply with the demands of the cartel. In
Part III, the effect of the Mexican cartels on the United States criminal
justice system is examined.6 Furthermore, the correlation between the
evolution of the cartels and the increase in drug and immigration
prosecutions in the United States is analyzed.7 This Comment then delves
into a narrower, more specific legal issue that arises when the Mexican
cartels force individuals to participate in crime.8 In Part IV, the history
and current state of the duress defense in the United States is explored.9
Part V begins with an analysis of whether a duress defense is legally viable
for a defendant who claims a Mexican cartel forced him to commit a
crime.10 Part V then concludes by arguing that changes in the law may
make a claim of duress more viable for defendants who are forced into the
commission of crimes.11
II. EVOLUTION OF MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL
ORGANIZATIONS
A. From Alcohol Smuggling to Marijuana
In order to understand the effects that Mexican cartels have on the
United States criminal justice system, it is important to realize the
magnitude and reach of these organizations. In order to realize the
magnitude of these organizations it is important to understand where they
came from.
Recently, United States District Court Judge Andrew Hanen, sitting in
the Southern District of Texas Brownsville division, wrote in a published
opinion, that “[Mexican] cartels initiate and control the vast majority of the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Infra, Part II.
Infra, Part III.
Infra, Part III.
Infra, Part III.
Infra, Part IV.
Infra, Part V.A.
Infra, Part V.C.
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drug trade, illegal cash and weapons smuggling, and human trafficking
facing Mexico and the United States.”12 Judge Hanen’s statement was
validated by the Drug Enforcement Administration in the 2015 National
Drug Threat Assessment Summary, which found that the main suppliers
of narcotics to the United States are the Mexican transnational criminal
organizations.13 However, Mexican cartels have not always been powerful
enough to be designated as TCOs. The powerful and violent Mexican
TCOs came from humble beginnings.
In 1848, the Rio Grande River was established as the international
boundary between the United States and Mexico under the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo.14 Shortly after the establishment of the international
boundary, individuals began smuggling goods from the United States to
Mexico and vice versa.15 In 1919, with the implementation of the
Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the United States outlawed
the production, sale, and transport of alcohol.16 However, even though
the U.S. Government had banned alcohol, the American public still
thirsted for it, which in turn led to the creation of a black market and a
need for smugglers of the illegal substance. Smuggling alcohol soon
became a profitable profession that rapidly proliferated.17 Fourteen years
later, the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed,18 but the professional
smuggling network that had been created stayed intact and quickly found
other illicit goods to replace alcohol.19 The smuggling networks that were

12. United States v. Ramirez, 38 F. Supp. 3d 818, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
13. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-16, 2015 NATIONAL
DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY iii (2015).
14. Amy White, History of Smuggling, TEX. LIBERAL ARTS, http://www.laits.utexas.edu/jaime/
cwp4/esg/smugglehistory.html [https://perma.cc/P946-DUA3].
15. Id.
16. See id. (“The smuggling of alcohol in the United States from Mexico did not become
hugely popular until the Prohibition Act of 1919 in the United States, which outlawed both the
production and consumption of alcohol products.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, §§ 1–3
(repealed 1933) (prohibiting the production and sale of alcohol in the United States).
17. White, supra note 14.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
19. See Arthur Rizer, Hannibal at the Gate: Border Kids, Drugs, and Guns – and the Mexican Cartel
War Goes On, 27 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 48, 55 (2015) (“By then end of the 1960s, Mexican criminal
gangs had assumed control of the smuggling routes and infrastructure necessary to ship opium,
marijuana, and domestically produced heroin to the Western United States.”).
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created to smuggle bootleg tequila are considered the forbearers of the
Mexican cartel.20
B. From Marijuana to Cocaine
After the prohibition era, the smuggling routes used for smuggling
alcohol were repurposed for the illegal transportation of marijuana and
“poppy” into the United States.21 Small, localized criminal groups
continued to control and profit from these routes through the early
1980’s.22 During that same time, the United States war on drugs was
focused on interdicting the importation of cocaine from Colombia that
was being smuggled through the Caribbean.23 As a consequence of those
efforts, the United States began to successfully close off the Caribbean
routes, which in turn forced the Colombian cartels to rely on the Mexican
corridor to get their product into the United States.24 As a result, the
small local groups smuggling marijuana into the United States began to see
increased profits as they incorporated cocaine smuggling into their
repertoire.25 Through these changes, the Mexican cartels, as they are
recognized today, began to take shape.26

20. See Michael E. Martínez Peña, Organized Crime Growth and Sustainment: A Review of
the Influence of Popular Religion and Beliefs in Mexico 48–49 (Mar. 2016) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (citing JUAN RAMÍREZPIMIENTA, CANTAR A LOS NARCOS: VOCES Y VERSOS DEL NARCOCORRIDO [SINGING TO THE
NARCOS: VOICES AND VERSES OF THE NARCOCORRIDO] 20 (Federal District, Mexico: Temas De
Hoy, 2011)) (“The [Thirteenth Amendment], also called the ‘dry law,’ lasted until 1933 and resulted
in the illegal importation of alcohol from . . . Mexico . . . . On the repeal of [the Thirteenth
Amendment] in 1933, drug smuggling became the primary illegal trade . . . .”).
21. See Martín Paredes, The Evolution of the Mexican Narcos, EL PASO NEWS (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://epn.xyz/2016/01/07/the-evolution-of-the-mexican-narcos/ [https://perma.cc/F7ET-989S]
(noting Mexico has been home to many drug smugglers, and “[e]ach of them ran heroin and
marihuana individually through the territories they each controlled”); see also Peña, supra note 20
(acknowledging the end of prohibition lead to the development of the drug trade).
22. Paredes, supra note 21.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See STEVEN DUDLEY, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA:
ITS EVOLUTION AND ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 4 (Migration Pol’y Inst. eds., 2012),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/RMSG-TransnationalCrime.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GUD8-R6GM] (discussing the development of the cartels after the introduction
of cocaine to the list of smuggled goods).
26. See id. (observing cocaine was initially distributed through the Mexican criminal
organizations that “included the beginnings of what would later become known as the Sinaloa,
Tijuana, Juarez, and Gulf cartels”).
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Commentators have used the term cartel to describe Mexican drug
trafficking organizations.27 Arguably, Mexican cartels are not cartels in
the true sense of the word, as it does not appear that they are attempting
to artificially control the pricing of their products.28 Regardless, however,
for purposes of this Comment, that distinction is irrelevant. Historians
have traced the major Mexican cartels (with the exception of the Gulf and
Zetas Cartels) back to one cartel—the Guadalajara Cartel.29 Over time,
the Guadalajara Cartel splintered into several groups that formed the
beginning of today’s major cartels.30 At the outset, these groups generally
operated in areas that were broken up by geographical boundaries within
Mexico, referred to as plazas.31 Each group owned and operated the
smuggling routes in their respective geographical zones that were
established back in the days of prohibition.32 The Mexican cartels
controlled what happened in their plazas by paying bribes to the politicians
and police forces found in their geographical zones.33 If the politicians or
police refused bribes to cooperate, the cartels simply enforced their will
through the use of violence.34 Early in this time period, the major cartels
were content with operating their plazas and reaping the profits generated
from smuggling drugs.35 However, this soon changed with the
militarization of the cartels.36

27. Paredes, supra note 21.
28. See id. (“A cartel is an association of manufacturers or suppliers that artificially control
pricing . . . . The Mexican drug organizations, for the most part, do not control the manufacture or
distribution of the illicit drugs but instead act as conduits from the source to the final destination.”).
29. See id. (“Mexican drug cartels evolved through familial, or blood ties directly from the
Guadalajara cartel, all from family members originating in Sinaloa.”).
30. See id. (“It also makes it easier to understand the constant evolution of the gangs as part of
[] ever changing loyalties among the criminals that evolved from the Guadalajara drug cartel into over
20 drug gangs and two-to-three drug trafficking organizations operating in Mexico today.”).
31. See DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 5 (“Plazas signify a territory controlled by a gang . . . .”);
Paredes, supra note 21 (“Mexico has had many drug smugglers, each controlling their own routes into
the United States.”).
32. See Paredes, supra note 21 (discussing the various drug routes used by traffickers); see also
Peña, supra note 20 (discussing the development of the drug trade following the end of prohibition).
33. Id.
34. See id. (examining the use of intimidation to control a plaza).
35. See DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 4–5 (describing the early history of the cartels as “small,
family-based organizations”).
36. See id. (militarizing the cartels transformed them from smuggling organizations to
sophisticated criminal organizations).
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From Cocaine to Human Smuggling

In the late 1990’s, the Gulf Cartel began to hire deserted military special
forces soldiers to provide protection for their smuggling routes, and to
enforce their organizational goals.37 The Gulf Cartel soon realized that by
employing their own personal army, it was possible to encroach on the
other cartels’ plazas—effectively co-opting, or outright stealing, other
cartels’ established smuggling routes.38 At the same time that the Gulf
Cartel began expanding their geographic area of operation, they (along
with other cartels) also began to expand into other areas of crime.39
Crimes such as kidnapping, theft and resale of oil and gas, and weapons
smuggling soon became part of the illicit activities that the cartels were
profiting from.40 Another area that the cartels took a high interest in was
human smuggling.41
Human smuggling organizations, like the early alcohol smuggling
groups, were typically run by small, criminal organizations.42 These
organizations charged money in exchange for a guide, or “coyote,” to
bring persons into the United States illegally.43 As the cartels expanded
their criminal organizations, they took over human smuggling groups
either directly by operating them, or indirectly by forcing the smaller
groups to pay a “piso” (tax) to operate in the cartel’s area.44 Human
smuggling organizations often engaged in practices such as holding the
smuggled individual against their will until the individual’s family paid

37. See DAVID A. SHIRK, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE DRUG WAR IN
MEXICO 10 (2011) (describing the Zetas as “a paramilitary enforcer group comprising elite former
military forces recruited by the Gulf Cartel”).
38. DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 5.
39. Id.
40. Damon Tabor, Radio Tecnico: How The Zetas Cartel Took Over Mexico With Walkie-Talkies,
POPULAR SCIENCE (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/radio-tecnico-howzetas-cartel-took-over-mexico-walkie-talkies [https://perma.cc/W6XR-ERA8].
41. Id.
42. Kyra Gurney, Mexico Human Trafficking Web Exposes Changing Role of Cartels, INSIGHT
CRIME (July 31, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/human-trafficking-drug-cartelsmexico [https://perma.cc/GEX2-A9A7].
43. DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 14–15.
44. Id. at 14; see also Ana Davila, Drug Cartels: Where Human Trafficking and Human Smuggling Meet
Today, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ana-davila/drugcartels-where-human-trafficking-and-human-smuggling-meet-today_b_7588408.html [https://perma.
cc/AVC5-QVKJ] (reporting the absorption or destruction of smaller human trafficking organizations
by major cartels).
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additional fees.45 However, the cartels upped the ante by using smuggled
individuals to supplement their work force.46 There is documented
evidence that cartels have forced people to smuggle drugs into the United
States, and have executed them if they refused to participate.47
D. From Cartel to Quasi-State
From their humble beginning of smuggling tequila, discussed in
Section A above,48 Mexican cartels have grown from organizations with
influence, primarily in Mexico, to multi-billion dollar organizations with
influence and operations all over the world.49
In some areas in Mexico, the cartels’ act as quasi-states.50 In those
areas, the Mexican government is incapable or unwilling to confront the
groups.51 The cartels have their own military,52 communication
networks,53 and language.54 They use weapons that are the kind and
grade deployed by national militaries.55 In 2009 (the last year that the
National Drug Assessment provided a profit estimate), the United States
Department of Justice estimated the Mexican cartels’ gross profits to be as
high as thirty-nine billion dollars a year.56 That amount is higher than the
45. DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 14.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id.
48. Supra, Part II.A.
49. Money, Guns, and Drugs: Are U.S. Inputs Fueling Violence on the U.S.–Mexico Border? Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
111th Cong. 33, 35 (2009) [hereinafter Money, Guns, and Drugs] (statement of Michael A. Braun,
Managing Partner, Spectre Group International, LLC).
50. See SHIRK, supra note 37, at 3 (“[S]ome [cartels] capitalize on antigovernment sentiments
and have operational control of certain limited geographical areas.”).
51. See Tabor, supra note 40 (“[Zetas] operate with such impunity that their authority eclipsed
that of the Mexican government itself.”).
52. See SHIRK, supra note 37, at 10 (stating the Gulf Cartel was the first cartel to hire former
Mexican special forces soldiers).
53. Tabor, supra note 40 (“[The Zetas] understood that a widespread communications system
would provide a crucial competitive edge over other cartels.”).
54. See Ken Ellingwood, Grim Glossary of the Narco-world, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2009),
http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-narco-glossary28-2009oct28-story.html
[https://perma.cc/X8RR84M3] (listing Mexican media’s vocabulary of Mexican Cartel actions); see also JOINT PUBL’N
RESEARCH SERV. REPORT, JPRS-LAM-89-002, LATIN AMERICA REFERENCE AID: GLOSSARY OF
SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE NARCOTICS TERMS (1989) (cataloging words used as code words by the
cartel in order to disguise their conversations).
55. See SHIRK, supra note 37 (detailing the types of weapons used by cartels).
56. NAT’L DRUG ADMIN. INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRODUCT NO.
2008-Q0317-005, 2009 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT III (2009).
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gross domestic product of over 100 countries in the world.57 The
Mexican cartels also have their own intelligence networks that watch and
report on everything that happens in the area.58 The networks are so
advanced and complete that the cartels know everything that is happening
in the areas that fall under their respective geographical purview.59 In
many areas of Mexico, the cartels are better informed than the government
as to what is happening in a town or city.60 In Nuevo Laredo,
Tamaulipas, Mexico, the Zetas Cartel infiltrated the city police force to
such an extent that they controlled the city’s emergency response.61 As a
result, the Zetas gained the ability to track and control all aspects of daily
life.62 All of this control and manipulation, creates a reality where citizens
are unable to turn to their government for intervention and have little
choice but to try and avoid the cartels.63
E. Transnational Criminal Organization Designation
As discussed above, the major Mexican cartels have expanded their
involvement from narcotics smuggling to any manner of crime that will
result in a profit.64 A Transnational Criminal Organization is defined by
the United States Government as an organization that conducts illegal and
legal operations across national borders in order to obtain monetary gains,

57. See Economy > GDP: Countries Compared, NATIONMASTER, http://www.nationmaster.com/
country-info/stats/Economy/GDP#2009 [https://perma.cc/5SWC-UBDN] (ranking all the
countries in the world by gross domestic product); see also CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA
WORLD FACTBOOK 2010 (2010) (providing gross domestic product for every nation in the world).
58. See George W. Grayson, Los Zetas: The Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug Cartel,
FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (May 13, 2008), http://www.fpri.org/article/2008/05/los-zetas-theruthless-army-spawned-by-a-mexican-drug-cartel/ [https://perma.cc/383P-EG2E] (describing the
complex system of workers that alert cartel members about day-to-day activities).
59. See Tabor, supra note 40 (noting the cartels have a multitude of informants, including, shoe
shiners, taxi drivers, taco vendors, and police officers).
60. See id. (“The [Zetas] developed a Stasi-like army of spies and integrated technology and
social media . . . . The result . . . was an intelligence network ‘without equal in the Americas.’”).
61. Id.
62. See id. (describing the sophisticated network of informants at the cartel’s disposal)
63. See Carrie F. Cordero, Breaking the Mexican Cartels: A Key Homeland Security Challenge for the
Next Four Years, 81 UMKC L. REV. 289, 292 (2012) (indicating officials and citizens have little choice
but to cooperate with the cartels or face death).
64. See, e.g., Tabor, supra note 40 (discussing the expansion of the Gulf Cartel “into
prostitution and gambling along the Rio Grande, building out a small but profitable criminal
enterprise”).
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power, and influence.65 The definition further provides that these groups
proactively protect their operations through the use of violence and
corruption.66 The United States Government has acknowledged the
growth of the Mexican cartels into TCOs and has started designating them
as such.67 Currently, there are at least eight Mexican cartels that the
United States Government has designated as such.68 This designation is a
recognition by the United States Government that the groups pose a threat
to the security of the United States.69 As will be discussed below, these
groups also affect the United States criminal justice system.70
F. Plata O Plomo As a Business Model
In the late 1970’s, the Colombian cartels were the main suppliers of
cocaine to the United States.71 The Colombian cartels, particularly the
Medellín Cartel run by Pablo Escobar, were highly successful in running
their drug smuggling organizations through the use of a business model
known as plata o plomo—silver or lead.72 Plata o plomo is a Faustian choice
of being paid a bribe (silver) to participate in a criminal organization or, in
the alternative, participating under the threat of being shot and killed
(lead).73 Mexican cartels have adopted the plata o plomo business model,
which has proved to be effective in developing their organizations.74

65. Nat’l Sec’y Council, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Definition, THE WHITE
HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/
definition [https://perma.cc/6V6M-UMBN].
66. Id.
67. Tom Barry, Transnational Criminal Organizations and Mexico’s Drug Wars, BORDER LINES
BLOG (June 24, 2011), http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/transnational-criminalorganizations.html [https://perma.cc/9AEG-DTZG].
68. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, DEA-DCT-DIR-065-15, UNITED STATES:
AREAS OF INFLUENCE OF MAJOR MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS 2
(2015).
69. Barry, supra note 67.
70. Infra, Part III.
71. Scott Stewart, From Colombia to New York City: The Narconomics of Cocaine, BUS. INSIDER
(June 27, 2016, 8:50 AM), http://www.businenessinsider.com/from-colombia-to-new-york-city-theeconomics-of-cocaine-2015-7?IR=T [https://perma.cc/2K8Y-JUGK].
72. Paredes, supra note 21.
73. Id.
74. See Lynn Vincent, Border Wars, WORLD MAG. (Mar. 28, 2009), https://world.
wng.org/2009/03/border_wars [https://perma.cc/DYA5-JVU8] (reporting law enforcement in
Mexico is impotent against the cartels due to their use of the plata o plomo business model).
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III. EFFECTS OF THE MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS ON THE
UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
As discussed above, the Mexican cartels have evolved into TCOs that
are involved in every area of criminal activity.75 In some geographical
areas of Mexico, the cartels operate as quasi-governments.76 This ability
to control and manipulate all aspects of the cartels’ adopted geographical
areas, affects citizens of those areas through their inability to do anything
other than cooperate with the cartels.77 The effects of the Mexican
cartels, however, are not limited to Mexico.78 Mexican cartels also have
an effect in the United States in many ways and on different levels.79
Specifically, their effects on the United States criminal justice system can
be seen at both the macro and micro level. This section will briefly discuss
the macro effects before turning to the micro effects.
A. A Macro Effect
The Mexican cartels’ total domination of both drug and human
smuggling into the U.S. has had a profound impact on the country’s
criminal justice system.80 This impact can be seen in such things as
spillover violence, criminal dockets, and prison population explosions.81
75. See Tabor, supra note 40 (recognizing cartels are involved with not only narcotics, but also
prostitution and gambling).
76. See id. (acknowledging Mexico’s Gulf Cartel “formed its own paramilitary unit . . . to seize
territory and dispatch rivals”).
77. See Cordero, supra note 63, at 292 (“When the choice is to cooperate, or face death of
oneself or one’s family, there really is no choice.”); Paredes, supra note 21 (noting cartels provide
citizens with only two options: “submit to the will of the smuggler and benefit from their money or
die opposing them”).
78. See Tabor, supra note 40 (explaining how a cartel built its drug empire, spanning across
Mexico and into the United States, by smuggling drugs worth several billions of dollars into the
United States).
79. Cordero, supra note 63, at 292–96 (2012) (indicating some families on the U.S. side of the
border “periodically need to hide or evacuate to avoid cross-border gunfire,” others have been
kidnapped or killed, and noting a number of U.S. officers who protect the border have been
corrupted by cartels).
80. See generally Money, Guns, and Drugs, supra note 49 (discussing factors that impact the U.S.
justice system such as: how those involved in the drug and human smuggling between Mexico and
the U.S. will face an adversarial judicial system, which they are not accustomed to; the need for more
crime labs; and the increase in kidnappings and killings).
81. Compare JAN CHAIKEN & DOUGLAS MCDONALD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ111763, DRUG LAW VIOLATORS, 1980–86 at 5 (Frank D. Balog ed., 1988) (noting the number of
offenders incarcerated for drug offenses was only 71% of those convicted in 1980), with MARK
MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 248470, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012
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It has, however, been acknowledged that the American populace’s desire
for drugs contributes to a large extent to the presence of Mexican cartels
and their illegal activity in the United States. Nonetheless, the efficiency of
the plata o plomo business model has produced a well-oiled machine that
pumps drugs and aliens into the criminal justice system at a historic rate.
The macro effects on the criminal justice system can be seen by looking
at the increased number of prosecutions for narcotics crimes and
immigration offenses.82 Bureau of Justice statistics reveal that in 1980,
around the time the Mexican cartels began to rise, the United States
Government convicted approximately 5,244 persons for drugs offenses.83
Furthermore, in 1985, it charged 7,239 persons with an immigration
offense.84 By 2012, those numbers rose to 28,427 convictions for drug
offenses and 25,682 for immigration offenses.85 One-third of the federal
drug arrests in 2012 were made in the federal judicial districts located on
the United States–Mexico border.86 The exponential rise in the number
of prosecutions for drug and immigration offenses from the early 1980s
through 2012 mirrors the expansion and evolution of the Mexican
cartels.87 Similarly, the number of those incarcerated for drug and
immigration offenses also mirrors the development of the Mexican
cartels.88 Although other factors certainly play an important part in the
STATISTICAL TABLES 21 (Irene Cooperman & Jill Thomas eds., 2015) (reporting 90.5% of those
convicted of drug offenses were incarcerated, and 76.1% of those convicted for immigration offenses
were incarcerated in 2012). Looking at these statistics, it is easy to see a correlation between the
presence of cartels and an increase in the percentage of incarcerations. CHAIKEN & MCDONALD,
supra at 5; MOTIVANS, supra at 21.
82. See JOHN SCALIA & MARIKA F. X. LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 191745,
IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2000 at 1, 5 (Tina Dorsey & Tom
Hester eds., 2002) (explaining the amount of U.S. prosecutions of noncitizens for drug trafficking
between 1985 and 2000 increased from 1,799 to 7,803; and the amount persons suspected of
immigration offenses increased from 7,239 to 16,495 in the same timeframe).
83. CHAIKEN & MCDONALD, supra note 81, at 4 (Frank D. Balog ed., 1988).
84. SCALIA & LITRAS, supra note 82, at 9. The report only provided data for the number of
persons charged with an immigration offense, and did not provide conviction data for 1985. Id.
85. MOTIVANS, supra note 81, at 17.
86. Id. at 7.
87. See CHAIKEN & MCDONALD, supra note 81, at 4 (providing the number of drug related
convictions increased by approximately 7,000 from 1980 to 1986); MOTIVANS, supra note 81, at 17
(showing the number of convictions for drug related offenses in 2012 was 28,427, while immigration
convictions increased to 25,682); Tabor, supra note 40 (recognizing Cartels have consistently grown in
Mexico since the 1980s).
88. See CHAIKEN & MCDONALD, supra note 81, at 5 (acknowledging the percent of offenders
sentenced to incarceration for drug offenses increased from 71% in 1980 to 77% in 1986, and the
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increase of prosecutions and prisoners throughout the years, it is
particularly significant that the Southwest Border has had the greatest rise
in number of prosecutions for drug and immigration offenses.89 These
statistics, which parallel the growth and strengthening of Mexican cartels,
are a strong indicator that their illegal activity within the United States have
a large impact on this country’s criminal justice system. It is anticipated
that a more in-depth analysis of prosecution and incarceration statistics
would further strengthen the argument that the system is being affected at
the macro level. However, further analysis at the macro level is outside the
scope of this Comment.
B. A Micro Effect – Forced Participation in Crime
While the effects of Mexican TCOs on the United States criminal justice
system can be readily observed at the macro level, as discussed in Part I,90
the Mexican TCOs have also had an effect on a micro level. One of the
ways that the Mexican TCOs have had an effect on the system at a micro
level is by forcing individuals to commit crimes.91 Defendants have
alleged that cartels have forced them to participate in an array of crimes,
from drug smuggling to murder.92 Statistically speaking, this does not
appear to have a large effect on the criminal justice system. However, the
problem is growing and there are no easy answers to the legal issue that is
created when an individual is forced to participate in a crime.93 Can the
defendant present a duress or necessity defense at trial or in mitigation of
punishment at sentencing? Even if they can, will it be successful?

percent of offenders sentenced to incarceration for non-drug offenses increased from 41% in 1980
to 43% in 1986); MOTIVANS, supra note 81, at 21 (informing 90.5% of the drug offenders and 76.1%
of the immigration offenders sentenced were incarcerated between October 2011 and September
2012); Tabor, supra note 40 (discussing the Cartels’ growth in Mexico since the 1980s).
89. See MOTIVANS, supra note 81, at 10 (confirming 2012 statistics that “1 in 5 matters referred
to U.S. attorneys by the DEA were from 5 federal districts along the U.S.-Mexico border”).
90. Infra, Part I.
91. See John Burnett, Migrants Say They’re Unwilling Mules for Cartels, NPR (Dec. 4, 2011,
6:16 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/04/143025654/migrants-say-theyre-unwilling-mules-forcartels [https://perma.cc/K2LH-LDQV] (detailing the cartels’ use of force to coerce migrants into
committing crimes).
92. Id.; Kevin Krause, Defendant in Southlake Cartel Lawyer Killing Says He Was ‘Forced’ to Stalk
Victim, DALLAS NEWS (May 5, 2016) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal).
93. See Burnett, supra note 91 (noting the government’s skepticism regarding duress claims and
the differing views of prosecuting and defense attorneys).
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IV. DEFINING, ANALYZING, AND UTILIZING THE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES OF NECESSITY AND DURESS
As shown in Part II,94 one of the effects that the Mexican cartels have
on the criminal justice system is the difficult legal issue that arises from
forcing individuals to participate in crime. What are the options for
individuals who, after being threatened with harm to their family, commit
crimes? Prosecutors have the authority to withhold prosecution if they
find the claim of forced participation with no viable alternatives to be
credible.95 Prosecutors, however, may not be inclined to decline
prosecution based on an arrested individual’s truthful or self-serving claim
of forced participation given their inability to verify its veracity. Absent a
declination of prosecution, the defendant is left with two options: plead
guilty and rely on the mercy of the court, or plead not guilty and present a
duress or necessity defense at trial.96 Section A below defines the
affirmative defenses of necessity and duress and presents their history in
federal jurisprudence.97 Section B analyzes the defenses of necessity and
duress as presented in federal jurisprudence.98 Section C discusses the
utilization of the duress and necessity defenses at both the trial and
sentencing phases of a case.99
A. Federal Jurisprudence Definition of Duress and Necessity Defenses
Black’s Law Dictionary defines duress in criminal jurisprudence as “[t]he
use or threatened use of unlawful force—usu. that a reasonable person
cannot resist—to compel someone to commit an unlawful act.”100 The
same dictionary defines necessity in criminal jurisprudence as “[a]
justification defense for a person who acts in an emergency that he or she
did not create and who commits a harm that is less severe than the harm
that would have occurred but for the person’s actions.”101 In most legal

94. Supra, Part II.
95. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-4.3(d) (4th ed.
Am. Bar Ass’n) (“A prosecutor’s office should not file or maintain charges if it believes the defendant
is innocent, no matter what the state of the evidence.”).
96. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1) (“A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or (with the
court’s consent) nolo contendere.”).
97. Infra, Part IV.A.
98. Infra, Part IV.B.
99. Infra, Part IV.C.
100. Duress, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
101. Necessity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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applications, duress has been classified as an excuse and necessity has been
classified as a justification.102 Traditionally, the defense of duress is
applicable when a defendant is forced to participate in a crime by threat of
force from a human source.103 On the other hand, a necessity defense is
available when a defendant is coerced into a criminal act by a force of
nature.104 The distinctions between the defenses of necessity and
duress—along with arguments of whether they are excuses or
justifications—have been, and continue to be, the source of great
debate.105 Fortunately, a resolution of that debate is outside the scope of
this Comment. It is sufficient to recognize that the distinction exists.106
The federal court system in the United States was established in
1789.107 Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that duress was a permissible defense to a violation of law.108 Since then,
the duress defense has been utilized with differing results in cases charging
offenses such as: possession with intent to distribute drugs,109 felon in
102. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (commenting that the
defense of necessity is generally held to be a justification for criminal conduct); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 491–92, 523 (4th ed. 2003) (footnote omitted) (finding an individual who commits a
crime under duress may be excused for committing the crime, and “[n]ecessity . . . is a defense
belonging in the justification category of defenses rather than the excuse category”); Monu Bedi,
Excusing Behavior: Reclassifying The Federal Common Law Defenses of Duress and Necessity Relying on the
Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575, 575 (2011) (“Most scholars categorize duress as
an excuse . . . and necessity as a justification . . . .”); Laurie Kratky Doré, Downward Adjustment and the
Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 745 (1995) (asserting
most jurisdictions classify duress as an excuse and necessity as a justification). But see Peter Westen &
James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, Not an Excuse—And Why It Matters,
6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 863 (2003) (arguing for the classification of duress defenses as
justifications).
103. See LAFAVE, supra note 102, at 491–92, 523 (4th ed. 2003) (describing duress as acting
“under the pressure of an unlawful threat from another human being”).
104. Id. at 523.
105. See Bedi, supra note 102, at 578 (“Scholars have extensively examined whether necessity
and duress are properly understood as excused or justified acts.”); Doré, supra note 102, at 744–745
(1995) (analyzing whether duress is a justification or an excuse); LAFAVE, supra note 102, at 491–92,
523 (4th ed. 2003) (detailing arguments between authors on the classification of the defenses as an
excuse or justification).
106. See LAFAVE, supra note 102, at 448 (“At early common law, the distinction between
justification and excuse was a critical one . . . .”).
107. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2012)).
108. See United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346, 347 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,621)
(finding the law recognizes fear as an excuse for committing a crime).
109. See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1344 (2d Cir. 1990) (determining generalized
fear is not sufficient to show fear of serious bodily harm or death).
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possession of a firearm,110 escape,111 kidnapping,112 and mutiny.113 The
Court’s decision in United States v. Vigol114 is the earliest known criminal
case in the United States that references the defense of duress.115 In its
decision, the Court stated, “[F]ear[,] which the law recognizes as an excuse
for the perpetration of an offence[,] must proceed from an immediate and
actual danger, threatening the very life of the party.”116 In affirming the
defendant’s guilt, the Court determined that fear of property loss or
apprehension of personal injury was not sufficient to avail oneself of a
duress defense.117
Not long after recognizing a defense of duress, the Court, in a series of
admiralty law decisions,118 recognized a defense of necessity.119 The
facts presented in each of those cases involved a ship that violated trade
laws by entering prohibited ports in the West Indies.120 In each case, the
defendants acknowledged breaking the law, but argued a necessity to enter
the off-limit ports to save their crew and cargo because of foul weather
and faulty or damaged ships.121 The Court held, in all three cases, that a

110. See United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming a defendant’s
conviction after determining that there was no evidence of an immediate threat of death or bodily
injury).
111. See United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1977) (concluding the
defendant was not entitled to a duress instruction because all elements of the defense were not met).
112. See United States v. Pestana, 865 F. Supp. 2d 357, 367 (S.D.N.Y 2011), aff’d sub nom,
United States v. Oriz, Nos. 11-4860(L), 11-4931(CON), 2013 WL 2150722 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting the
unavailability of a duress defense because there was no immediate threat of force).
113. See United States v. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207, 210 (C.C. Pa. 1823) (giving a jury instruction
which required a well-grounded fear of death for the availability of an excuse defense).
114. United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,621).
115. Bedi, supra note 102, at 585 n.58.
116. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 347.
117. Id.
118. See The New York, 16 U.S. 59 (1818) (recognizing a necessity defense when there was a
need to bring a ship into port because of a loss of the rudder); Brig Struggle v. United States, 13 U.S.
(9 Cranch) 71 (1815) (addressing a claim of necessity when the ship’s crew prematurely sold cargo at
another port to preserve the integrity and safety of their ship); Brig James Wells v. United States,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 22 (1812) (considering the defense of necessity as it applied to adverse weather
conditions affecting the safety of the ship’s route).
119. See Bedi, supra note 102, at 580 (footnote omitted) (“The first reference to necessity as a
defense to a violation of law appears to come from admiralty cases.”).
120. The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 68; Brig Struggle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 76; Brig
James Wells, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 22; see also Bedi, supra note 102, at 580 n.13 (discussing the admiralty
cases).
121. The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 68; Brig Struggle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 72–73; Brig
James Wells, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 22–23.
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claim of necessity would be viable with sufficient evidence to support the
claims; however, the Court in each case also found that the defendants did
not produce sufficient evidence to support the assertion of the defense.122
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Kirby,123 inferred a
necessity defense when deciding whether a county sheriff had violated a
federal statute that prohibited the delay of mail delivery by arresting a
postman for murder.124 In its decision, the Court provided an example of
a prisoner escaping a burning jail as a justification for committing the
crime of escape.125 The Court cited “common sense” in concluding that
the sheriff was justified in violating the statute.126 In its opinion, the
Court never used the term necessity; the Court examined the issue by
framing the sheriff’s choice as allowing the mail to be delivered or
arresting a murderer, thereby implying the sheriff’s necessity to break the
law.127
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court recognized both
necessity and duress defenses early in the nation’s history; however, it
would be over one hundred years before the United States Supreme Court
discussed the defenses at length.128
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Bailey,129 which, like
the example the Court referenced in United States v. Kirby, dealt with the
issue of whether an inmate who had escaped from a prison could present a
duress or necessity defense.130 In its decision, the Court stated, “[W]e
must decide . . . the elements that constitute defenses such as duress and
122. The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 68; Brig Struggle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 76; Brig
James Wells, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 25–26.
123. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868).
124. See id. at 486–87 (implying the necessity defense by analogy to a hypothetical prisoner
escaping a burning prison).
125. Id. at 487.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 486–87 (holding the sheriff’s arrest of the mail carrier was necessary and a better
choice than allowing the murderer to go free so that the mail recipients would not be
inconvenienced).
128. After the Supreme Court decided Kirby, the defenses of necessity and duress were not
discussed at length until the Supreme Court heard United States v. Bailey. United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394 (1980). See Bedi, supra note 102, at 585 (noting Bailey “provides the first detailed
discussion of duress in the criminal context”).
129. United States v Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
130. See id. at 415 (“An escapee who flees from a jail . . . may well be entitled to an instruction
on duress or necessity . . . .”); Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) at 487 (“[T]hat a prisoner who breaks prison
shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on
fire . . . .”).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss2/5

18

McPherson: Plata o Plomo

2018]

COMMENT

479

necessity.”131 The Court, nonetheless, did not list the specific elements of
either defense, but instead discussed the defenses as shaped by common
law.132 The Court wrote that, at common law, a defense of duress
excused criminal conduct when an individual was under “threat of
imminent death or serious bodily injury, which threat caused the actor to
engage in conduct violating the literal terms of the criminal law.”133 The
Court further noted that at common law a duress defense could only be
used when an individual was forced to participate in a crime by other
human beings.134 It provided an example of the proper use of a duress
defense through the hypothetical situation of individual B threatening to
kill individual A if A did not destroy a dike.135 The Court then
distinguished the necessity from duress, and described necessity as a
choice of evils that was applicable “where physical forces beyond the
actor’s control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.”136 It
described the proper use of a necessity defense through a hypothetical
situation where A could argue a necessity if A destroyed a dike to keep
valuable property from flooding.137 After defining both the necessity and
duress defenses, the Court indicated that neither defense could be used if a
defendant had a reasonable, legal alternative to committing a crime.138
The Court applied these definitions and their exception to its conclusion
that the defendants could not avail themselves of the defenses because of
insufficient evidence to support either claims.139
Twenty-one years later, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’
Cooperative,140 the United States Supreme Court cited United States v. Bailey
when acknowledging the existence of a necessity defense, stating it had
never completely rejected the defense.141 The Court defined the necessity

131. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 397.
132. See id. at 409–10 (“Common law historically distinguished between the defenses of duress
and necessity.”).
133. Id. at 409.
134. See id. at 409–10 (1980) (reviewing the common elements of duress).
135. Id. at 410.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. (“[I]f there [is] a reasonable, legal alternative . . . the defenses will fail.”).
139. See id. at 417 (holding the respondents failed to provide sufficient evidence because a
critical element was missing).
140. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
141. See id. at 490 (“[T]his Court has discussed the possibility of a necessity defense without
altogether rejecting it.”).
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defense as the “situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s control
rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.”142
In Dixon v. United States,143 the Court took one step closer to adopting
specific elements of a duress defense.144 In a footnote discussion, the
Court noted that the elements of a duress defense are not defined in any
federal statute.145 In the same footnote, the Court then listed specific
elements for a duress defense, qualifying such with: “[W]e presume the
accuracy of the District Court’s description of these elements.”146 The
Court then, citing a Fifth Circuit case,147 provided the following
requirements:
(1) The defendant was under an unlawful and imminent threat of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
injury; (2) the defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed herself in a
situation in which it was probable that she would be forced to perform the
criminal conduct; (3) the defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to
violating the law, that is, a chance both to refuse to perform the criminal act
and also to avoid the threatened harm; and (4) that a direct causal
relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal act and the
avoidance of the threatened harm.148

Although the case was ultimately decided on other grounds, and the
defense was not central to the holding, the Court appeared to embrace the
Fifth Circuit’s definition of duress.149
Until recent times, discussing the traditional definitions of duress and
necessity would sufficiently chronicle the legal community’s approach to
justification defenses. The two defenses were not mixed or crossed and,
as detailed, have been categorized as two separate and distinct defenses.
Notwithstanding their separateness, both the United States Supreme Court
142. Id. at 490 (quoting Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410).
143. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
144. See id. at 4 n.2 (acknowledging the district court’s description of the elements of defense).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 4 n.2 (citing United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.
1986)); accord United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 389 (5th Cir. 2010) (reciting the four elements
of a duress defense); see also United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1994) (summarizing the
four common elements of duress); United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1162–63 (5th Cir. 1982)
(purporting the same).
148. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 4 n.2.
149. See id. at 4 n.2, 17 (2006) (relying on the District Court’s description of the elements).
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and federal appeals courts have stated that, “Modern cases have tended to
blur the distinction between duress and necessity.”150 When discussing
the hybrid that emerges from merging the defenses of duress and
necessity, courts have labeled such as a “justification” defense, providing a
definition that mirrors the four elements the Supreme Court referenced in
Dixon v. United States.151 Combining the two defenses into one
justification defense may signal willingness from courts to eschew the
traditional separation of defenses along the lines of forces of nature
(necessity) versus human forces (duress).152
The history of the Court’s definition of the duress and necessity
defenses will form the foundation for analyzing how courts have applied
both defenses.
B. Analyzing the Defenses of Duress and Necessity
1. Duress
As discussed above, federal courts have embraced the definition of
duress as having four elements. The first element reads: “The defendant
was under an unlawful and imminent threat of such a nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury . . . .”153 In
analyzing the first element, it is necessary to break the element into three
parts: (1) the defendant was under imminent threat, (2) the threat was of a
nature of death or serious bodily injury, and (3) the threat induced a wellgrounded fear.
In order to meet the first element of the duress defense, courts have
consistently emphasized that a defendant must provide evidence that they
were operating under a present threat.154 Courts have required that the
150. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980); United States v. Contento-Pachon,
723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984); see United States v. Butler, 485 F.3d 569, 572 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007)
(stating the defenses of duress and necessity have been blurred “to the point of merger” (quoting
United States v. Holliday, 457 F.3d 121, 127 (1st Cir. 2006)).
151. See United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 409 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Dixon, 548 U.S. at
4 n.2).
152. See, e.g., Butler, 485 F.3d at 572 n.1 (“Courts have used the terms duress, necessity, and
justification interchangeably.” (citing Leahy, 473 F.3d at 406)).
153. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 4 n.2.
154. See United States v. Tanner, 941 F.2d 574, 587 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding the evidence
must show the threat of harm as one that is “present, immediate, or impending”). But see
United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401–02 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding a threat of economic harm by a
government official, although not as complete of a defense as duress, may be considered when
analyzing the specific intent needed for a bribery conviction).
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threat be immediate, and have rejected fear of future harm as being
sufficient to meet the standard.155 In United States v. Salgado-Ocampo,156
the court analyzed the word imminent.157 The defendant in that case
received a single phone call that threatened harm at a later time.158 The
court, in finding the defendant did not meet the requirement of acting
under imminent fear or bodily harm, found that the words imminent and
later were opposites.159 In United States v. Haynes,160 the Seventh Circuit
similarly declined to find imminent harm, even though harm might occur
within several hours.161 The Seventh Circuit’s refusal to find imminent
harm, when the facts showed the harm was likely to occur within several
hours, is representative of courts’ view that the harm must be akin to
simultaneous.162 In fact, courts have stated that finding the type of
imminent danger that would justify a duress defense would be a rarity.163
Although courts have stressed that all elements of the duress defense must
be present to utilize the defense, the immediacy element is often a court’s
focus when determining if the defense is allowed.164 Courts’ strict
interpretation of imminent danger casts doubt on the receptiveness of an
argument that presents duress due to threat of future harm as a defense to
a crime.

155. See Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 359 (9th Cir. 1951) (“We
know of no rule that would permit one . . . to claim immunity from prosecution . . . by setting up a
claim of mental fear of possible future action . . . .”).
156. United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1998).
157. See id. at 326–27 (interpreting imminent to mean the opposite of later).
158. Id. at 326.
159. Id. at 326–27 (citing United States v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1090 (7th Cir. 1998)).
160. United States v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089 (7th Cir. 1998).
161. See id. at 1090 (holding threat of action, which was set to occur later that afternoon, was
insufficient to raise the justification defense).
162. See United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 269, 271–72 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding an
implication that harm was imminent when the defendant had been stabbed in the stomach); see also
United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding the defendant was in
imminent harm when a gun was produced during an altercation).
163. See United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 874 (4th Cir. 1995) (“It has been only on the
rarest of occasions that our sister circuits have found . . . the type of imminent danger that would
warrant the application of a justification defense.”).
164. See United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1976) (classifying all elements of
a duress defense as necessary, but emphasizing “the element of immediacy” as one of “crucial
importance”).
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To allow a duress defense, courts have not only required the harm to be
immediate, but that it also involve death or serious bodily injury.165
Courts have declined to allow a duress defense based on a threat of
incarceration,166 property damage,167 or economic coercion.168 What is
not clear is whether courts will deny the defense if the threat of death or
serious bodily injury is directed towards a third party.169 In Iva Ikuko
Toguri D’Aquino v. United States,170 the Ninth Circuit decided a case in
which the appellant was convicted of treason, and appealed the verdict
based on, among other issues, an argument that the district court
committed errors when addressing her duress defense.171 The appellant
had been convicted of treason for working as a radio broadcaster for the
Japanese Government during World War II.172 She argued that the trial
court erred when providing jury instructions that indicated that a duress
defense required the fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm be
directed toward her, personally.173 The appellant presented evidence
during trial, indicating that she knew the Japanese government had
tortured and killed individuals that did not participate in radio broadcasts
and, because of this knowledge, she was afraid for her safety and was, thus,

165. See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006) (requiring the harm to be “of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury”).
166. See United States v. Alexander, 287 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2002) (receiving threats of
incarceration “is not sufficient coercion to excuse the commission of a crime” (citing United States v.
Lemon, 824 F.2d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1361
(6th Cir. 1984) (holding a jury instruction, which provided that threat of incarceration is insufficient
for a duress defense, was proper (citing United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815, 820–21 (6th Cir.
1982)).
167. See United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 666–68 (2d Cir. 1979) (declining to allow a
duress defense for a store owner who believed he was going to be robbed).
168. See United States v. Colacurcio, 659 F.2d 684, 690 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding coercion by
law enforcement officers insufficient to create a duress defense based on “economic coercion”).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1984)
(acknowledging the possibility of immediacy when believable threats were directed to related third
persons); contra Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 360–61 (9th Cir. 1951)
(concluding there was insufficient evidence of immediacy when threats were made against known
third persons).
170. Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951).
171. See id. at 357 (detailing the defendant’s argument, which contended that the trial court
provided inappropriate jury instructions for her duress defense).
172. Id. at 347–48.
173. See id. at 360 (recounting the defendant’s assertion that the trial court erred by concluding
knowledge of harm to other prisoners of war did not create a mental state sufficient to support a
duress defense).
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coerced into working at the radio station.174 The Ninth Circuit noted the
trial court granted the appellant latitude by allowing evidence of atrocities
and threats of atrocities against third persons, under the theory that this
information had a bearing upon the appellant’s state of mind.175
However, the court ultimately denied the appeal and affirmed the
conviction by upholding the trial court’s jury instruction.176 It should be
noted that the appellant made a compelling argument that the element of
duress requiring apprehension of impending death or serious bodily harm
should be inapplicable in cases where a defendant was in an enemy
country and was compelled to act by an enemy government.177 Because
she was unable to get protection from the United States, the appellant
argued that it was erroneous for the duress defense to require an imminent
threat of death or bodily harm.178 The appellant provided authority for
the proposition that if an individual joined a rebellion because he was
forced to, and could provide proof of such force, then a presumption
exists that the individual continued in the rebellion against his will even if
there was no constant force keeping him from leaving.179 The Ninth
Circuit considered whether this argument would be viable for an individual
claiming forced service into enemy military service, before determining it
was inapplicable to the facts of the case before it.180
The Ninth Circuit has allowed a duress defense to be presented when a
defendant alleged a third party was the recipient of a threat of imminent
harm.181 In United States v. Contento-Pachon,182 the court remanded the

174. See id. (providing accounts of other prisoners of war who were punished for disobeying
orders).
175. See id. at 361 (acknowledging the trial judge’s theory of relevance for threats against third
persons “as bearing upon the state of mind of the appellant”).
176. See id. (“We think that the record [as a] whole discloses that the jury was not
misled . . . .”).
177. See id. at 358–59 (addressing the defendant’s contention that known threats of death or
torture made by enemy governments against its prisoners of war satisfies the immediacy
requirement).
178. Id.
179. See id. at 359 (citing EDWARD HYDE EAST, TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
70–71 (P. Byrne eds., 1806)) (“It may perhaps be impossible to account for every day, week, or
month; and therefore it may be sufficient to excuse him if he can prove an original force upon him[.]”).
180. Id.
181. See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693–94 (9th Cir. 1984) (setting
forth a duress defense, which alleged threats against third persons, namely, the defendant’s wife and
child).
182. United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984).
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case back to the district court to allow evidence of a duress defense to be
presented to a jury.183 In that case, Contento-Pachon lived in Bogota,
Colombia, where he was employed as a taxi driver.184 On one occasion,
Contento-Pachon was offered a job as a “drug mule” to carry cocaine to
the United States.185 Contento-Pachon turned down the offer to
transport the drugs, which resulted in a death threat against his wife and
child if he did not cooperate.186 Contento-Pachon eventually complied,
due to the threat, and agreed to carry the drugs.187 Prior to departing the
country with the drugs, Contento-Pachon was informed he was being
watched, and that if he did not follow all instructions, he, along with his
family, would be killed.188 Nonetheless, the trial court found ContentoPachon’s evidence was “insufficient to support a duress defense.”189 The
appeals court noted that the trial court denied the duress defense because
it had found the threats of harm to Contento-Pachon were not
immediate.190 The Ninth Circuit, however, found Contento-Pachon’s
testimony credible and held the threats of harm to him and his family were
not threats of future harm, but were in fact immediate.191 In support of
its finding, the court cited evidence that the individual that had threatened
Contento-Pachon was deeply involved in the distribution of narcotics,
their drugs were worth a lot of money, and information regarding
Contento-Pachon’s family and residence had been specifically mentioned
in the threats against him.192 In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit specifically
discussed the threat to a third party (the defendant’s family) in the
determination that the defendant was entitled to present evidence of a
duress defense.193 Although the court considered the threats to the
defendant along with the threats to a third party, the court did not hesitate

183. Id. at 695–96.
184. Id. at 693.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 694 (“The district court found that the initial threats were not immediate
because ‘they were conditioned on defendant’s failure to cooperate in the future and did not place
defendant and his family in immediate danger.’”).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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in finding that threats to a third party should be considered as proof of
coercion.194
Lastly, courts have required that imminent threats must induce a wellgrounded fear.195 Courts have rejected evidence of a generalized fear and
have required that the threat be specific and, as previously discussed,
immediate.196 In using an objective standard, requiring that the fear be
well-grounded, courts do not allow a defendant to make an arbitrary claim
that he was afraid.197 In United States v. Nwoye,198 the court asserted,
“Reasonableness is the touchstone of a duress defense.”199 In its
decision, the court held that the fear of imminent death or serious bodily
harm must be reasonable.200
The second element of the duress defense requires “the
defendant . . . not recklessly or negligently place . . . herself in a situation in
which it was probable that she would be forced to perform the criminal
conduct[.]”201 The Second Circuit discussed this element at length in its
United States v. Agard202 decision.203 In the Agard case, the facts indicate
that the appellant was working in his shop when he initiated an altercation
between himself and three other individuals.204 When the altercation
escalated, the appellant grabbed an assault rifle and fired at the
individuals.205 On a subsequent occasion, the appellant attempted to
assist the police in apprehending an armed individual that had shot a police

194. See id. (addressing the multiple threat factors against the defendant that supported a
duress defense).
195. See id. at 693 (noting one of the three elements of duress is “a well-grounded fear that the
threat will be carried out”).
196. See United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he fear must be
more than a general apprehension of danger, particularly if one has the chance to escape or to seek
the protection of government.”).
197. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (requiring the fear to “induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury”). But see United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d
1129, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[A]ny assessment of the reasonableness of a defendant’s actions must
take into account the defendant’s ‘particular circumstances,’ at least to a certain extent.”).
198. United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
199. Id. at 1136.
200. Id.
201. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 4 n.2.
202. United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1979).
203. See id. at 667–68 (holding there can be no defense where a defendant negligently or
recklessly subjects themselves to duress).
204. Id. at 666.
205. Id.
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officer.206 The appellant armed himself with a shotgun and approached
the police to offer his assistance.207 The police arrested the appellant
when they discovered that he was armed.208 The appellant was
subsequently charged and convicted of unlawful possession of a
firearm.209 Thereafter, the appellant appealed the conviction because the
trial court refused to instruct the jury on a duress defense.210 The court
determined, in its analysis, that the defendant had deliberately placed
himself in a situation where he felt the need to arm himself.211 In making
such determination, the court relied on the evidence presented at trial,
which showed that the appellant leapt over the counter of his pizza shop
and tried to physically remove the individuals he believed may have been
threatening him.212 The evidence showed that only after the appellant
initiated the fight, which eventually escalated, did he feel the need to arm
himself with a firearm.213 The court noted that the shop owner took
action despite any evidence that the men were armed or any request by the
appellant for the men to leave.214 It determined that the appellant actively
placed himself in the high-risk situation and, therefore, could not receive a
jury instruction on duress for possessing a weapon.215 The court also
concluded that the appellant similarly placed himself in an unsafe situation
when he armed himself with a shotgun and tried to assist the police in
apprehending a dangerous individual.216 Because the appellant recklessly
or negligently placed himself in a position of danger, he was not entitled to
a jury instruction on a defense of duress.217 Although the second element

206. Id. at 666–67.
207. Id. at 667.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 668 (noting the “appellant admitted that he initiated the altercation, which
resulted in his seeking a weapon”).
212. See id. (“By attempting to physically eject the men from his shop . . . appellant cause[d]
himself to be placed in a situation in which he could well have expected possible harm.”).
213. Id.
214. See id. (“Although [the defendant] testified that there was ‘talk of gunplay’ and vague
threatening motions by one of the men involved, he did not see any weapons nor did he demand that
they leave his shop.”).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See id. (“Therefore, having placed himself in such a potentially dangerous situation,
appellant can hardly be heard to claim that the danger he encountered justified his unlawful conduct.
He was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the defense of duress and coercion.”).
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must be analyzed when affirmatively pleading a duress defense, the
hypothetical situation discussed in the introduction of this Comment
would likely not qualify as a situation in which an individual has recklessly
or negligently placed himself in a position in which he must perform a
crime.
The third element of the duress defense requires that a “defendant had
no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, that is, a chance both
to refuse to perform the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened
harm.”218 In Shannon v. United States,219 the Tenth Circuit heard an appeal
from defendants that were convicted of conspiracy to commit
kidnapping.220 The appellants were appealing the trial court’s refusal to
give jury instructions which would have allowed the jury to acquit the
appellants if they were found to have been acting under coercion.221 In
its decision, the appeals court recognized that coercion could excuse the
commission of a crime; however, it noted that the availability of an
opportunity to avoid the criminal act, would render the defense
unavailable.222 The facts indicate that the appellants first became
involved in the conspiracy when a kidnapped individual was brought to
their ranch.223 The appellants allowed the kidnapped individual to remain
at their ranch under guard for a couple of days.224 The kidnapped
individual was then moved to another location where he remained under
guard for several more days.225 Throughout the ordeal, the appellants
assisted in guarding the kidnapped individual, and also provided ice and
meals to the other individuals that were involved in the crime.226 The
evidence showed that the appellants participated in the crime voluntarily
and were not threatened in any manner until the day the kidnapped
individual was released.227 In its decision, the court analyzed the facts and
determined that the appellants had ample opportunity to end their

218. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006).
219. Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935).
220. Id. at 491.
221. Id. at 492.
222. See id. at 493 (“One who has full opportunity to avoid the act without danger of that kind
cannot invoke the doctrine of coercion . . . .”).
223. Id. at 492.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 492–93.
226. Id. at 493.
227. Id.
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participation in the crime and report such to the police.228 The court
seemed to focus on the large amounts of time the appellants were not in
the presence of the individuals that eventually threatened them when it
stated, “One who has full opportunity to avoid the act without danger of
that kind cannot invoke the doctrine of coercion and is not entitled to an
instruction submitting that question to the jury.”229
The Sixth Circuit has stated that “the keystone of the analysis” of a
duress claim is whether or not there is an alternative to violating the
law.230 In United States v. Singleton,231 the court found that if there is an
alternative to committing a crime that arises before or during the event,
failure to take the alternative will result in a denial of a duress defense.232
The Fifth Circuit’s standard is slightly more onerous, requiring the
defendant actually try the alternative in order to argue that he had no
alternative.233
The Tenth, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits’ analysis of the third duress element
leaves little room for support of a duress defense for the hypothetical
presented in the introduction of this Comment. However, the First
Circuit’s decision in R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co.234 seems to detail a more forgiving analysis of when a defendant will
or will not have a reasonable legal alternative to committing a crime.235
The court acknowledged that coercion will excuse crimes if each element
of the defense is met.236 The facts of the case indicate that the plaintiff
received a phone call from his brother’s wife requesting that he meet his
brother at a location in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.237 When the plaintiff
arrived at the meeting he was forced into a vehicle, told that he would be
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 473 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980)).
231. United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1990).
232. Id. at 473.
233. See United States v. Estrada-Monzon, No. 16-40542, 2017 WL 2813855, at *3 (5th Cir.
June 28, 2017) (“Because duress is an affirmative defense, a defendant must present evidence of each
of the elements before it may be presented to a jury.” (quoting United States v. Posada-Rios,
158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998))).
234. R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1949).
235. See id. at 606 (finding no basis for the assumption that a police force would be unable to
protect any person that may be threatened if an individual, committing a crime under coercion, alerts
the authorities).
236. Id. at 605.
237. Id. at 604.
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driven to his place of business, and ordered to remove cash from the safe
and take it to armed individuals.238 The armed individuals informed the
plaintiff that if he did not comply with their orders, his brother and his
brother’s wife would be harmed.239 The plaintiff complied with the
orders, gave the money to the armed individuals, and then alerted the
police as to what had occurred.240 The plaintiff argued he had been acting
under coercion and, as such, he was innocent of any dishonesty, fraud, or
criminal act.241 The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s judgment
against the plaintiff.242 In its decision, the appeals court focused on the
fact that the plaintiff was allowed to leave the presence of the armed
individuals, enter the building, remove the money, and walk over a mile to
deliver the money.243 Like the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Shannon v.
United States, the First Circuit determined that the plaintiff had plenty of
time to avoid the crime and alert the authorities.244 The court dismissed
the plaintiff’s argument that he was unable to alert the authorities because
he pre-supposed that the police would be unable to protect him and his
family.245 The court based the dismissal on its belief that the police forces
in Pawtucket and Providence, Rhode Island were adequately equipped and
staffed to take on the armed individuals and protect the plaintiff and his
family.246 The court’s analysis, thus, opens an argument that a case could
be distinguished if the facts indicate that threats are made from individuals
that the local police or authorities are unable to provide protection from.
The fourth and final element of the duress defense requires that there
be “a direct causal relationship . . . reasonably anticipated between the
criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm.”247 In United States
v. Alston,248 the Third Circuit discussed the fourth element of the duress
defense.249 The facts indicate that the appellant was arrested for
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 604–05.
241. Id. at 605.
242. Id. at 606.
243. Id. at 605–06.
244. Id. at 606.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006).
248. United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2008).
249. See generally id. at 96 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing the causal relationship as it applies to a
felon in possession of a firearm).
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“possession of a firearm by a convicted felon” after Philadelphia Police
responded to reports of gunshots in the city.250 The appellant admitted to
possessing the firearm but stated that he needed the gun for self-defense
because he had seen a man that had shot him one-year prior.251 The
appellant, who was wearing a bulletproof vest when arrested, asserted that
the man who had previously shot him had told him “he was going to
‘get’” him.252 The appellant further indicated that after being told this, he
retrieved a gun from his mother’s house for protection.253 The appellant
was arrested the same day he started carrying the weapon.254 The trial
court denied the appellant the use of the justification defense, and the
appellant filed a timely appeal.255 The appeals court determined there was
“no direct causal relationship between the criminal action (possession of a
firearm) and avoidance of the threatened harm (retaliation by Bentley).”256
In its analysis, the court concluded that even though the appellant had
seen the man who had shot him and had heard him say that, “he was going
to ‘get’” him, the appellant’s actions were not sufficiently connected to the
crime.257 When making this determination, the court focused on the
imminence of the harm to gauge the appellant’s need for the weapon.258
Because the court ascertained that the harm was not imminent, the court
found the connection of the crime to the avoidance of the harm to be
attenuated, and, therefore, the appellant was precluded from using a duress
defense.259 The court then proceeded to analyze imminence in depth by
citing cases previously discussed above in the analysis of the first element
of the duress defense.260
The Alston court’s focus on the imminence of the harm—to determine
the presence of a causal connection—brings the analysis of the elements
of the duress defense full circle.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
v. Panter,
defense).

Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (“As noted, Alston was arrested around 10 p.m. that same night.”).
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 95–96.
See id. (“The causal relationship in these circumstances is attenuated at best.”).
Id.
Id. at 96.
See id. (citing United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United States
688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing the imminence requirement needed for a duress
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2. Necessity
The United States Supreme Court has not provided the elements of a
necessity defense; however, in United States v. Maxwell,261 the First Circuit
determined that a necessity defense required a defendant to prove “that he
(1) was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil, (2) acted to
prevent imminent harm, (3) reasonably anticipated a direct causal
relationship between his acts and the harm to be averted, and (4) had no
legal alternative but to violate the law.”262 In United States v. Maxwell, the
defendant was convicted of unauthorized entry into a naval installation.263
The facts indicate that the defendant entered a United States naval station
located on the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico in an attempt to disrupt livefire artillery exercises that the Navy planned to conduct on the island.264
The defendant believed that the live-fire exercises would involve a Trident
nuclear submarine.265 The defendant appealed his conviction on multiple
grounds, including the trial court’s denial of the presentation of a necessity
defense.266 The necessity defense that the defendant proposed ran as
follows: the unlawful entry on the naval station designed to stop the
exercise and the deployment of a nuclear submarine was a lesser evil than
allowing the Navy to continue with the live-fire exercise; the harm was
imminent because the defendant believed one of the submarines was in
the immediate vicinity of the island; the defendant believed that
committing the unlawful entry would halt the live-fire exercise leading to
the dispersion of the nuclear submarine; and, finally, the defendant had
previously taken other actions to no avail.267 As such, there was no other
alternative but to trespass on the naval station.268 In analyzing the
defendant’s appeal, the Maxwell court discussed the elements of a necessity
defense as they applied to the facts of the defendant’s case.269
As for the first element, the appeals court did not provide any
meaningful analysis of the defendant’s claim that he had chosen the lesser

261. United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001).
262. Id. at 27 (citing United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 1995)).
263. Id. at 23–24.
264. See id. at 23 (noting the history of protests that have arisen as a product of politically
controversial, live-fire artillery and bombardment exercises carried out on the island).
265. Id. at 27.
266. See id. at 24 (detailing Maxwell’s arguments concerning his appeal).
267. See id. at 27.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 26–29.
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of two evils.270 The court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the
defendant’s claim—that he committed the unlawful entry onto the naval
station because it was less of an evil than allowing the Navy to deploy a
nuclear submarine and perform live-fire exercises on the island—was
sufficient to carry the burden of production necessary to proceed with the
necessity defense.271 The court was more skeptical of the defendant’s
arguments regarding the three remaining elements.272
Next, the court discussed the element of imminent harm.273 The court
defined the term imminent harm as being one of “a real
emergency . . . involving immediate danger to oneself or to a third
party.”274 The court was dismissive of the defendant’s claim that the
deployment of the nuclear submarine was an imminent harm.275 The
court took apart the defendant’s claim of imminent harm in two steps.276
It first determined that the defendant was unable to offer evidence that the
submarine was in the area.277 Subsequently, the court found that even if
the defendant had provided evidence that the submarine was in the area,
without proof that the submarine was going to actually detonate anything,
the defendant’s claims were insufficient to demonstrate an imminent
harm.278
After discussing the first and second elements of the necessity defense,
the court turned to the third element.279 It stated that in order to show a
reasonable anticipation of averting harm in the context of a protest, the
“defendant must demonstrate [a] cause and effect between an act of
protest and the achievement of the goal[.]”280 The court further
270. See id. at 27 (foregoing any discussion of a two-evils analysis, and instead assuming that
the requirement was met).
271. See id. (“We assume, for argument’s sake, that Maxwell carried the entry-level burden of
production on the first component (‘lesser of two evils’).”).
272. See id. (discounting the last three elements of Maxwell’s defense).
273. Id. at 27–28.
274. Id. at 27.
275. See id. (“[E]ven if Maxwell could have shown that a nuclear submarine was close at hand,
it is doubtful that the mere presence of such a vessel, without some kind of realistic threat of
detonation, would suffice to pose an imminent harm.”).
276. See id. at 27–28 (addressing the elements of imminent harm and “reasonable anticipation
of averting harm”).
277. See id. (“The record contains no evidence to support Maxwell’s naked averment that the
harm he feared was imminent.”).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 28.
280. Id.
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determined that the defendant did not present any evidence supporting a
reasonable belief that his unlawful entry would cause the Navy to cancel
the exercises and disperse the submarine.281 In its analysis, the court
focused on the reasonableness aspect of whether the defendant could
anticipate harm being averted.282 The court did not present a definition
of reasonableness, but it did provide an example of what would not be
reasonable behavior.283 Referring to a case that is factually similar to
United States v. Maxwell, the court cited United States v. Montgomery,284 an
Eleventh Circuit decision, that held it was not reasonable to believe that
entering a nuclear launch site and vandalizing it would lead to nuclear
disarmament.285
Lastly, the Maxwell court discussed the legal alternative element.286 The
court stated that in order for a necessity defense to succeed, a defendant
must show that he violated the law because there was no legal
alternative.287 The court expounded on this element by stating that the
necessity defense does not arise from a choice of an action from all
available actions.288 The defense is only available when a defendant’s
actions are necessary and preclude all other options.289 The court placed
a high burden on this element of the necessity defense when it asserted,
“A defendant’s legal alternatives will rarely, if ever, be deemed exhausted
when the harm of which he complains can be palliated by political
action.”290 The Fifth Circuit addressed this element in United States v.
Posada-Rios,291 by noting that a defendant’s subjective belief of whether
alternatives were available was not the standard.292 The Maxwell court
found that, because the defendant had not exhausted his legal alternatives,

281. See id. (“Maxwell’s anticipation [was] pure conjecture, not [a] reasonable belief.”).
282. See id. (“On this record, then, Maxwell could not reasonably have anticipated that his act
of trespass would avert the harm that he professed to fear.”).
283. See id. (finding trespass and temporary disruption could not reasonably ward off the harm
the defendant intended to prevent).
284. United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985).
285. Maxwell, 254 F.3d at 28 (citing Montgomery, 772 F.2d at 736).
286. Id. at 28–29.
287. Id. at 28.
288. Id.
289. See id. (describing the necessity defense as arising from an emergent crisis with only one
course of action).
290. Id. at 29.
291. United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998).
292. Id. at 874.
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he did not meet the burden of production on the fourth element of the
necessity defense.293
C.

Utilizing Duress and Necessity Defenses

A defendant has a right to utilize an affirmative defense at trial, at the
sentencing phase, or both.294 Regarding the right to utilize an affirmative
defense at trial, the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, in
United States v. Rodriguez,295 that if the defense theory is valid and the
record contains evidence to support the theory, then a defendant is
entitled to a jury instruction on the theory.296 In order to utilize a duress
or necessity defense, it is necessary to clear two hurdles: (1) the defendant
must present relevant evidence;297 and (2) the defendant must present
evidence sufficient to support the burden of production.298 If both of
these hurdles are cleared, then the issue of who—defense or
prosecution—carries the burden of persuasion, arises.
1. Utilizing Duress and Necessity Defenses at Trial
As noted above, a court must first determine whether the evidence to
support a defense of duress or necessity is relevant.299 For evidence to be
admissible, it must be relevant.300 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states,
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.”301 The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the Rule’s standard of relevance as being a liberal

293. Maxwell, 254 F.3d at 28–29.
294. See id. at 26 (finding a defendant has a broad right to utilize a defense); see also
United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 1992) (determining rejection of a duress defense
by the jury does not preclude the judge from giving a lower sentence based on that defense). But see
United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508–09 (1st Cir. 1990) (restating the view that a defendant
cannot appeal a sentence based on the sentencing court’s refusal to depart from the appropriate
sentencing guideline range).
295. United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1988).
296. Id. at 812.
297. See Maxwell, 254 F.3d at 26 (finding no right to present irrelevant evidence).
298. Id. at 26.
299. See id. (emphasizing the need that evidence be relevant in order to invoke a criminal
defendant’s right to present such).
300. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (citing FED. R. EVID.
402).
301. FED. R. EVID. 401.
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one.302 Trial judges make the determination of whether evidence is
relevant or not.303
After determining whether evidence is relevant or irrelevant, a trial court
will then determine if the evidence is sufficient to support the burden of
production.304 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that, in order
to present evidence of a duress or necessity defense at trial, a defendant
must “meet a minimum standard as to each element of the defense so that,
if a jury finds it to be true, it would support an affirmative
defense . . . .”305 The trial court determines the minimum standard a
defendant must meet.306 In order to make the determination of whether
the defendant has met the minimum standard, the trial court does not
engage in fact-finding, but merely makes an inquiry into whether the
evidence is legally sufficient.307 Courts have determined that evidence is
legally sufficient when “it creates a genuine factual dispute.”308 Other
courts have stated that evidence is legally sufficient when it is more than
“flimsy or insubstantial.”309 In making this determination, courts will
look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.310
Courts have generally described the evidence that is necessary to support
the burden of production in broad strokes (i.e., “more than flimsy;” must
create a triable issue); however, courts have determined that a defendant’s
conclusory or self-serving statements are not sufficient to create a triable
issue.311

302. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
303. United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Cruz,
797 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1986)).
304. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Thus, when the
proffer in support of an anticipated affirmative defense is insufficient as a matter of law to create a
triable issue, a district court may preclude the presentation of that defense entirely.” (quoting United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414–15 (1980))).
305. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415.
306. See United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[T]he court’s function
is to examine the evidence of record . . . to see if the proof, taken most hospitably to the accused, can
plausibly support the theory of defense.”).
307. Id.
308. United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 1986).
309. Id. at 1165 (quoting United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1985)).
310. United States v. Reyes, 645 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. Hill,
626 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1980)).
311. Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165–66 (citing United States v. Kakley, 741 F.2d 1, 4 (1st. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 887 (1984)).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss2/5

36

McPherson: Plata o Plomo

2018]

COMMENT

497

The last issue that must be addressed for a defendant to utilize a duress
or necessity defense at trial is deciding which side will have to carry the
burden of persuasion. In In re Winship,312 the United States Supreme
Court explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
requires the prosecution to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.313 In McKelvey v. United States,314 the United States Supreme Court
concluded that affirmative defenses must be set up and established by the
side relying on the defense.315 In Dixon v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court decided a case in which a petitioner contended that the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury that she was required to prove a
duress defense by a preponderance of the evidence instead of requiring the
prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable
doubt.316 The facts of the case indicate that the petitioner was indicted
and convicted of making false statements linked to a firearm acquisition
(18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)) and receiving a firearm during the time she was
under felony indictment (18 U.S.C. § 922(n)).317 At trial, the petitioner
admitted to committing the offenses, but claimed she did so because her
boyfriend threatened her with death or harm to her family if she did not
purchase the weapons.318 The petitioner’s argument contained two
assertions: (1) her duress defense “controverted the mens rea required for
conviction” and, therefore, the prosecution was required to carry the
burden of persuasion; and (2) modern common law requires the
government to bear the burden of persuasion.319
The Dixon Court addressed the petitioner’s arguments by analyzing the
issue of who is required to carry the burden of persuasion.320 The Court
began its analysis by noting that the statutes the petitioner was charged and
convicted of violating contain a mens rea element.321 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)
312. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
313. Id. at 364.
314. McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922).
315. See id. at 357 (reinforcing the notion that a party asserting a defense must bear the burden
of proof on that defense).
316. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006).
317. Id. at 3.
318. Id. at 4
319. Id. at 5.
320. See id. at 5–17 (discussing the assignment of the burden upon either the government or
the defendant).
321. See id. at 5 (noting the crimes petitioner was convicted of require one to act “knowingly”
or “willfully”).
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requires the accused to have acted “knowingly” and 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(D)322 requires the accused to have acted “willfully.”323 The
Court, referencing In re Winship, asserted that the prosecution bore the
burden of proving the mens rea elements beyond a reasonable doubt.324
The Court determined, however, that the prosecution met its burden when
the petitioner admitted in court, through her testimony, that she
committed the crimes.325 In admitting that she committed the crimes, the
petitioner argued that she was forced to commit the crimes and, therefore,
did not meet the mens rea required by the statute.326 Nevertheless, the
Court, citing United States v. Bailey, noted that affirmative defenses do not
negate mens rea; instead, the defenses “allow . . . the defendant to ‘avoid
liability . . . because coercive conditions or necessity negates a conclusion
of guilt even though the necessary mens rea was present.’”327 The Court
also supported its decision by noting that the crimes the petitioner was
convicted of violating are statutory offenses that are not analogous to any
common law crime, and that a duress defense does not disprove any
elements of a statutory crime.328
The Court then discussed how the burden of persuasion has been
historically allocated in statutory offenses.329 It began its discussion by
observing that federal crimes are exclusively created by statute and the
elements of those crimes are defined by the legislature.330 The Court
further affirmed that, for the crimes at hand, Congress defined the specific
mental states as requiring the defendant to act “knowingly” or
“willfully.”331 Furthermore, the Court determined that the prosecution is
required to prove those specific mental states beyond a reasonable
doubt.332 The Court, citing Patterson v. New York,333 indicated that “[t]he
322. 18 U.S.C. § 922(n)
does
not
contain
a
mens
rea
requirement,
but
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D)—the sentencing provision of the statute—does. See Dixon, 548 U.S. at 5
(detailing the difference between the statutes).
323. See Dixon, 548 U.S. at 5 (“[T]he term ‘willfully’ in § 924(a)(1)(D) requires a defendant to
have ‘acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’”).
324. Id. at 5–6 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
325. Id. at 6.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 7 (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980)).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 n.12 (1977)).
333. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard . . . has always been
dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given
case.”334 The Court then concluded its analysis of the petitioner’s
argument—that a duress defense controverts the mens rea of the offense—
by finding that there is no constitutional basis for requiring the
prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion.335
The Dixon Court subsequently addressed whether modern common law
requires the prosecution to disprove the petitioner’s duress defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.336 The Court, citing both Patterson v. New
York and Mullaney v. Wilbur,337 began its analysis by observing that
common law requires that the defendant carry the burden of persuasion
for affirmative defenses.338 The Court noted that the common law rule,
in the duress defense context, is in accord with the doctrine that “where
the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party,
that party has the burden of proving the issue.”339 The petitioner argued
that “two important developments” supported her contention that
modern law requires the government to bear the burden of persuasion:
(1) the Supreme Court decision of Davis v. United States; and (2) the Model
Penal Code.340
The Court first addressed the petitioner’s reliance on Davis v.
United States341—a United States Supreme Court decision requiring the
government to carry the burden of persuasion on whether a defendant was
sane.342 The Court found that Davis v. United States did not support the
petitioner’s argument for multiple reasons.343 First, the Court noted that
the Davis Court required the prosecution to prove the defendant’s sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt because that evidence disproved an essential
element of the murder charge.344 The Dixon Court thus dismissed the
petitioner’s argument, finding that the evidence produced at trial did not
334. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 7–8 (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 211 n.12).
335. Id. at 8.
336. Id.
337. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
338. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 8.
339. Id. at 9 (citing 2 J. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 415 (5th ed. 1999)).
340. Id. at 8.
341. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
342. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 8.
343. See id. at 9–15 (distinguishing Davis from the present case and expounding on why Davis
was not applicable).
344. Id. at 11 (citing Davis, 165 U.S. at 378).
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disprove the elements of the crimes she was convicted of.345 Second, the
Dixon Court acknowledged that Davis v. United States may have
“establish[ed] a general rule for federal prosecutions . . . that an accused is
‘entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if upon all the
evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of
committing crime.’”346 This rule, in effect, required the government to
prove a defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt if a defendant was
able to carry the burden of production as to his sanity.347 The Court then
foreclosed the petitioner’s argument by noting that Leland v. Oregon348
determined that the Davis rule was not mandated by the Constitution.349
Furthermore, Congress had overruled Davis by creating a statute that
required a defendant to carry the burden of persuasion as to “his insanity
by clear and convincing evidence.”350 As such, the Court determined that
the petitioner was unable to argue that the Davis decision was relevant to a
duress defense argument.351 Lastly, the Dixon Court echoed its previous
observation that all federal crimes are statutory and, as such, the Court
must enforce the duress defense as contemplated by Congress in the
context of the crimes at hand.352 The Court noted that Congress did not
include a duress defense in the statute that the defendant was convicted of
violating.353 Consequently, the Court assumed that Congress—familiar
with the common law requirement that the defendant bear the burden of
proving an affirmative defense and the Court’s holding in McKelvey v.
United States—would expect courts to apply those same approaches to a
duress defense.354
The Court then addressed whether the Model Penal Code is evidence of
a new common law rule that the government must bear the burden of
persuasion and disprove a duress defense beyond a reasonable doubt.355
The petitioner argued that the Model Penal Code placed the burden on the
prosecution to disprove a duress defense beyond a reasonable doubt; that
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id.
Id. (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952)).
Id.
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
Dixon, 548 U.S. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 15–17.
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Congress was familiar with the Model Penal Code; and that Congress
intended to model the statutory language for the crimes at hand after the
Model Penal Code.356 The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument by
noting that the statutory language of the crimes at hand did not adhere to
the language of the Model Penal Code and, therefore, it was unlikely that
Congress intended the Court to interpret the statutes through the lens of
the Model Penal Code.357
The Court concluded its analysis by finding that Congress could require
the prosecution to disprove a duress defense beyond a reasonable doubt if
it were to include such language in enacted legislations.358
2. Utilizing Duress and Necessity During Sentencing
All hope is not lost if a defendant is unable to bring a duress or
necessity defense to the jury. As noted above, courts have recognized a
defendant’s right to utilize a defense of duress when sentenced.359
Defendants are allowed to argue, at the time of sentencing, that they
committed a crime under duress or necessity regardless of whether or not
the defense is sufficient to present to a jury.360 The United States
Sentencing Commission recognized that duress and necessity can be
utilized at sentencing, and included both defenses in the section of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which discusses grounds for
departure.361 In United States v. Booker,362 the United States Supreme
Court held that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, and
that courts are no longer bound to apply the Guidelines when
pronouncing a sentence.363 However, the Booker Court did make clear
that a sentencing court must still consider the Guidelines as a factor when

356. Id. at 15–16.
357. Id. at 16.
358. Id. at 17.
359. United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 1992).
360. Id.
361. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.11–5K2.12 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016) (discussing grounds for downward departure based on evidence of duress or
necessity).
362. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
363. See id. at 264 (noting district courts are not required to apply the Guidelines during
sentencing).
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calculating a sentence.364 As such, a sentencing court must consider all
relevant grounds for departure contained in the Guidelines Manual.365
As noted above, the Guidelines Manual recognizes both duress and
necessity as grounds for departure from a guideline sentence.366 In
section 5K2.11, the Guidelines Manual discusses when a departure for a
necessity defense may be appropriate.367 The relevant language contained
in the Guidelines Manual states that it may be appropriate for a court to
reduce a sentence when a defendant committed a crime out of necessity to
avoid a greater harm.368 Much like the definition of necessity at the
liability stage, the Guidelines do not indicate how to categorize levels of
harm.369 However, the Guidelines require that the actions taken by the
defendant “significantly diminish society’s interest in punishing the
conduct.”370
In section 5K2.12, the Guidelines Manual discusses when a duress
defense is grounds for departing from the Guidelines.371 Similar to the
finding made by the Amparo Court, the Guidelines state that a defense of
duress may be used to argue for a reduced sentence even if the defense
was not sufficient to amount to a complete defense.372 The Guidelines
Manual states that any decrease in the sentence based on a duress claim
should take into account: (1) the reasonableness of actions taken; (2) the
defendant’s actions in proportion to the duress involved; and (3) the extent
to which the defendant’s conduct was less harmful than what the
defendant believed it to be.373 The Guidelines Manual limits any
reduction of a sentence to cases that involve threat of physical injury,

364. See id. at 259–60 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must
consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”).
365.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.11–5K2.12 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016) (“Relevant distinctions not reflected in the guidelines probably will occur rarely and
sentencing courts may take such unusual causes into account by departing from the guidelines.”).
366. Id.
367. See id. at § 5K2.11 (“Sometimes, a defendant may commit a crime in order to avoid a
perceived grater harm”).
368. Id.
369. See Bedi, supra note 102, at 592 (“[T]he Guidelines make no reference to the kind of harm
required to be averted.” (emphasis added)).
370. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
371. Id. at § 5K2.12.
372. Id; see United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 1992).
373. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.12 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
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substantial property damage, or similar injury that results from a third
party’s unlawful actions.374
V. VIABILITY OF A DURESS OR NECESSITY DEFENSE GOING FORWARD
Part IV defined and analyzed the defenses of duress and necessity as
utilized in the federal court system. The question then becomes: Where
does the current state of the law pertaining to a duress defense leave the
hypothetical case of Roberto? Under the current state of the law, can
Roberto find justice or is he relegated to being punished for his forced
involvement in a crime? Court analysis indicates that a duress defense is
not very successful at trial or during the sentencing phase.375 The main
issue with a duress defense in this context is that, in the majority of
situations, a judge or jury is forced to weigh the uncorroborated testimony
of a defendant, who has been caught breaking the law, against the evidence
of the crime (i.e., drug loads or other tangible evidence).376 There is rarely
any tangible evidence to corroborate the defendant’s story that he was
forced to participate in the crime.377 In the case of Roberto, even if he
was willing to provide testimony that he only participated in the crime
because his family was threatened, will he be willing to provide sufficient
testimony in light of the fact that his family is still in danger? The
remainder of the Comment will analyze Roberto’s case under the state of
the current law and suggest arguments that may offer defendants, in
situations similar to Roberto’s, a way to find justice.
A. Is a Duress Defense Viable?
Assuming—based on the hypothetical—that Roberto will be charged
with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance
(21 U.S.C. § 841),378 the prosecution will have to prove beyond a
374. Id.
375. Burnett, supra note 91.
376. Id.
377. See id. (describing the defense as a trendy one that rarely works but is nonetheless used in
hopes that it will work).
378. It is also likely that Roberto would be charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. § 846), as prosecutors frequently add-on this charge in
order to increase leverage on the defendant. Daniel Medwed, Memo to Marty Walsh: Why
Prosecutors Love to Charge Defendants with Conspiracy, WGBH NEWS, (Aug. 10, 2016),
http://www.news.wgbh.org/2016/08/10/news/memo-marty-walsh-why-prosecutors-love-chargedefendants-conspiracy [https://perma.cc/GP9W-HL5Q]. A conspiracy charge would beg the
question: whether Roberto, acting under duress, could possibly be in agreement with the individuals
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reasonable doubt that Roberto knowingly or intentionally possessed the
drugs with intent to distribute them.379 Roberto will be forced to decide
if he wants to plead guilty, and be eligible to receive a benefit, such as a
sentence reduction for accepting responsibility, or fight the charge by
attempting to present evidence of duress, which is considered an
affirmative defense.380 He must consider the possibility that if he is
unsuccessful in his duress defense, he will not receive any credit at
sentencing for acceptance of responsibility, which will likely lead to a
longer sentence.381 The following analysis is based on Roberto’s
hypothetical decision to utilize a duress or necessity defense.
As discussed in Part IV, if Roberto chooses to assert an affirmative
defense, he must first offer relevant evidence that is sufficient to support
the burden of production.382 It is beneficial to Roberto that courts have
interpreted the standard of relevance liberally.383 Thus, Roberto’s
testimony of how he was forced to smuggle drugs into the United States is
relevant in that “it has [a] tendency to make a fact more or less
probable . . . .”384
A bigger concern for Roberto is his ability to meet the burden of
production. Roberto will likely be forced to attempt to carry the burden of
production based solely on his testimony, which creates a problem.
Although courts will look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the
that coerced him into the commission of the crime. In United States v. Cessa, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed this issue. United States v. Cessa 861 F.3d 121, 130–133 (5th Cir. 2017). The
court noted that the defendant must be allowed to tell his story. See id. at 130 (“Defendants charged
with participating in a conspiracy to launder money may argue that they did not ‘join[] the
conspiracy[.]’” (quoting United States v. Cessa 785 F.3d 165, 175 (5th Cir. 2015))). The defendant
argued that he was not part of a conspiracy by directly attacking the element of conspiracy that
requires a specific intent to join a conspiracy. The court, in its decision to remand the case, pointed
out that the defendant was not arguing that he joined the conspiracy under duress; instead, the
defendant was arguing that he was involved with the Cartels (conspirators) out of fear. Id.
379. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
380. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1) (listing the pleas available for a criminal defendant); see also
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (“If the
defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level
by [two] levels.”).
381. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. 2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2016).
382. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (citing FED. R. EVID.
401); see United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining a defendant’s duty to
present relevant evidence in support of an affirmative defense).
383. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
384. FED. R. EVID. 401(a).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss2/5

44

McPherson: Plata o Plomo

2018]

COMMENT

505

defendant, courts have stated that a defendant’s self-serving statements are
not sufficient to meet the minimum standard.385 However, in United States
v. Contento-Pachon—a case directly on point with the case at hand—the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision that the
defendant had not offered sufficient evidence to support a duress
defense.386 The Contento-Pachon court did not discuss the type of evidence
offered in the case; however, the court constantly referenced ContentoPachon’s testimony when making the determination that the evidence
offered was sufficient to support a duress defense.387 Furthermore, the
Contento-Pachon court found that “[f]actfinding is usually a function of the
jury, and the trial court rarely rules on a defense as a matter of law.”388
Relying on Contento-Pachon, Roberto’s testimony that he was forced to bring
drugs into the United States creates a genuine factual dispute and, thereby,
is arguably sufficient to carry his burden of production.
As discussed in Part IV,389 Roberto must carry the burden of
production for each element of the duress or necessity defense.390 The
first element of the duress defense requires that the defendant act under
immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury.391 In light of the
narrow definition of what constitutes an immediate threat, it may be
difficult for Roberto to meet the immediate-threat standard.392 The
hypothetical facts indicate that Roberto’s family was implicitly threatened
and then, days later, he smuggled the drugs into the United States.
However, Roberto has a viable argument when viewed through the lens
supplied by the Contento-Pachon court. Much like the hypothetical case at
hand, Mr. Contento-Pachon and his family were threatened with bodily
harm if he did not smuggle drugs into the United States.393 The Contento-

385. United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164–66 (10th Cir. 1986).
386. See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We reverse
because there was sufficient evidence of duress to present a triable issue of fact.”).
387. See id. at 693–95 (analyzing the elements of duress through the defendant’s testimony).
388. Id. at 693.
389. Supra, Part IV.
390. See Contento-Pachon, 72 F.2d at 693 (“There are three elements of the duress defense:
(1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will
be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.”).
391. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006).
392. See Contento-Pachon, 72 F.2d at 694 (“The element of immediacy requires that there be
some evidence that the threat of injury was present, immediate, or impending.”).
393. See id. at 693 (“Jorge told Contento-Pachon that his failure to cooperate would result in
the death of his wife and three-year-old child.”).
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Pachon court acknowledged that “a veiled threat of future unspecified
harm” did not satisfy the definition of immediate.394 The court
determined, however, that the evidence provided supported the argument
that future threats to Mr. Contento-Pachon and his family would have
come to fruition in the form of immediate and harsh consequences if he
had refused to cooperate.395 The court supported its conclusion by
noting that the man that threatened Mr. Contento-Pachon was deeply
involved in the drug business and that large amounts of money were
involved in the transaction.396 The court also indicated that the man
threatened Mr. Contento-Pachon’s wife and child even though he had
evidently never met them.397
As previously discussed, the first element of a duress defense also
requires that the threat of death or serious bodily injury be wellgrounded.398 In Part II of this Comment,399 the discussion led to the
conclusion that Mexican Cartels are violent and more than capable of
carrying out threats of violence. Roberto’s testimony—that the men who
coerced him into participating in a crime appeared to be working for a
large well-organized group—would support the argument that his fear was
reasonable and well-grounded.400 In light of the Contento-Pachon court’s
analysis, Roberto has an excellent argument that the implied threats
regarding his family—made by those men—are sufficient to qualify as
immediate and in the nature of death or serious bodily injury.
The second element of the duress defense requires that Roberto not
have recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which he
would be forced to commit a crime.401 The facts presented in the
hypothetical indicate that Roberto was walking home from work and had
no previous contact with the men that threatened him. Roberto
committed the crime two days after the initial threat. Therefore, because
394. Id. at 694 (citing R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605
(1st Cir. 1949)).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See id. at 693–94 (detailing how the man who threatened the defendant “mentioned facts
about Contento-Pachon’s personal life, including private details which Contento-Pachon had never
mentioned to” him).
398. Id. at 693.
399. Supra, Part II.
400. See Contento-Pachon, 72 F.2d at 695 (concluding the defendant offered credible evidence
that he acted under immediate and well-grounded threats).
401. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006).
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the crime was committed after Roberto and his family had already been
threatened, the second element would likely be met in Roberto’s favor.
The third element requires that Roberto have had no reasonable legal
alternative to violating the law.402 The Contento-Pachon case is on point
regarding this issue. In Contento-Pachon, the defendant received a threat and
did not act for several weeks after the threat.403 The district court
observed that the defendant had plenty of time to alert the authorities or
leave the area.404 However, the court of appeals noted that the evidence
offered was sufficient to create a fact issue regarding whether or not the
defendant was able to go to the police since they were known for being
corrupt.405 Additionally, as discussed above, in a separate case, the
First Circuit determined that a defendant was unable to claim a duress
defense because he did not go to the police.406 In R.I. Recreation Center,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the court found that the police force was
adequately staffed and equipped to take on the armed individuals that had
threatened the defendant.407 In Part II of this Comment,408 however, the
analysis led to the conclusion that the Mexican Government is not
adequately staffed or equipped to take on the Mexican Cartels. As such,
both Contento-Pachon and R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. provide support for
Roberto’s claim that he had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the
law.
The fourth element requires that Roberto show an anticipated direct
causal relationship between bringing the drugs into the United States and
avoidance of his family’s death.409 As discussed in Part IV,410 United
States v. Alston focused on the imminence of the harm to determine if there
was a direct causal relationship.411 Therefore, because Roberto has a
402. Id.
403. See Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 693 (indicating the defendant did not act immediately
after the threats were made, but rather met with the man who threatened him on two subsequent
occasions before carrying out the crime).
404. Id. at 694 (“The district court found that because Contento-Pachon was not physically
restrained prior to the time he swallowed the balloons, he could have sought help from the police or
fled.”).
405. Id. at 693 (“Contento-Pachon testified that he did not contact the police because he
believe[d] that the Bogota police [were] corrupt and that they [were] paid off by drug traffickers.”).
406. R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605–06 (1st Cir. 1949).
407. Id. at 606.
408. Supra, Part II.
409. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006).
410. Supra, Part IV.
411. United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 95–96 (3d Cir. 2008).
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strong argument that he faced imminent harm and can provide testimony
to that point, he meets the fourth required element of the duress defense.
The foregoing analysis supports a strong argument that Roberto would
be able to present or proffer evidence sufficient to prove each element of a
duress defense, thereby carrying his burden of production.412 The
determination of whether Roberto has carried this burden of production,
however, will likely be made by the presiding judge prior to trial.413 If the
presiding judge rules that Roberto has carried the burden of production,
Dixon v. United States then requires that Roberto carry the burden of
persuasion.414 The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Johnson415
provides guidance regarding at what point the defense must be presented
to the jury: “Where a defendant claims an affirmative defense, and that
‘defense finds some support in the evidence and in the law,’ the defendant
is entitled to have the claimed defense discussed in the jury
instructions.”416 The Johnson court further noted that the burden is met
“even when the supporting evidence is weak or of doubtful
credibility[.]”417 Therefore, it is likely that Roberto would be able to get a
jury instruction that recognizes his assertion of a duress defense.
B. Is a Necessity Defense Viable?
In Part IV418 it was indicated that the necessity defense has traditionally
only been available when the coercion originated from a physical force of

412. In United States v. Estrada-Monzon, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “Because
duress is an affirmative defense, a defendant must present evidence of each of the elements of the
defense before it may be presented to the jury.” No. 16-40542, 2017 WL 2813855, at *3 (5th Cir.
June 28, 2017) (citing United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also United
States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733, 736 (11th Cir. 1985) (“In order to have [an affirmative] defense
submitted to a jury, a defendant must first produce or proffer evidence sufficient to prove the
essential elements of the defense.” (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412 n.9 (1980))).
413. The Government is likely, pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b), to file a motion in limine
to prohibit the presentation of the defense to the jury. If, during the hearing, Roberto is unable to
prove each element of the defense, he will be unable to present the defense to the jury. See United
States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2005) (“When, as in this case, the issue is raised in a
pretrial motion, the rule is to be applied just the same: if the defendant’s proffered evidence is legally
insufficient to support [an affirmative] defense, the trial judge should not allow its presentation to the
jury.” (quoting United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1343 (2d Cir. 1990))).
414. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 17.
415. United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2005).
416. Id. at 467 (citing United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962, 970 (6th Cir. 1976)).
417. Id. (quoting Garner, 529 F.2d at 970).
418. Supra, Part IV.
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nature.419 The elements of a necessity defense were also discussed and
shown to mirror those of a duress defense with slight variances: (1) a
choice of evils; (2) the actions were to prevent imminent harm;
(3) reasonable anticipation of direct causal relationship between the acts
and the harm to be avoided; and (4) no legal alternative to violating the
law.420 The defendant in Contento-Pachon argued that he violated
21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) because he chose the evil of bringing drugs into the
United States over the death of his family.421 Once again the court’s
decision in Contento-Pachon provides insight as to whether or not Roberto
has a viable necessity defense. The Contento-Pachon court did not address
each element of the necessity defense in affirming the trial court’s denial of
the defendant’s necessity argument.422 Instead, the court denied the
defendant’s arguments on two grounds: (1) the defendant’s acts were
coerced by a human force instead of the requisite physical force of nature;
and (2) the defendant was not acting in the interest of the general
welfare.423 In its analysis, the court recognized the traditional distinction
that separates duress and necessity (human coercion vs. physical force of
nature).424 The court then observed that modern courts have “blur[red]
the distinction between duress and necessity[,]” but ultimately determined
that the traditional view was appropriate and decided that the defendant
was precluded from using a necessity defense.425 The court’s holding in
Contento-Pachon is directly on point with Roberto’s case and forecloses an
argument that a necessity defense is viable.426
C.

Arguments for Change

This Comment has attempted to frame the effects that the Mexican
Cartels have on the United States criminal justice system. The Cartel’s
ability to control areas of Mexico and force individuals to participate in
419. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (“The
[necessity] defense ‘traditionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s
control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils’” (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394, 410 (1980))).
420. United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2001).
421. United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984).
422. See id. (omitting any discussion of the elements of the defense).
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 695–96 (holding the necessity defense was correctly excluded under facts similar to
those at hand).
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crime is one of the areas that affects the system.427 Ordinary men and
women live in constant fear of being co-opted into a life of crime with
little to no recourse.428 These men and women are unable to flee, or turn
to authorities for help, leaving little choice but to accept the silver or take
the lead.
The United States Supreme Court once asserted that, “[t]he doctrines of
actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have
historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the
tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing
religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of
man.”429 The Mexican Cartel’s evolution has affected the criminal justice
system in more ways than one. This is the time to use the aforementioned
tools to make some adjustments by reconsidering the law pertaining to the
defenses of duress and necessity. Two solutions that would serve to adjust
the tension are: (1) shifting the burden of persuasion to the government, and
(2) redefining the necessity defense. Making either one of these changes
would provide additional tools to assist a defendant that has been forced
to participate in crime.
1. Shifting the Burden of Persuasion
The United States criminal justice system was developed with the goal
of “safeguard[ing] men from dubious and unjust convictions, with
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.”430 In support of this
goal, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as
requiring prosecutors to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”431 In Speiser
v. Randall,432 the Court stated that in litigation there is a margin of error
(represented by error in fact finding) that the defendant and the
prosecution must take into account.433 The Court first observed that the
margin of error is reduced for the defendant by placing the burden of

427. See Burnett, supra note 91 (detailing the method by which traffickers have been forcibly
recruiting illegal immigrants to backpack drugs into the United States).
428. Id. (describing how Mexican drug cartels force immigrants to smuggle drugs into the
United States, and if they resist, kill them).
429. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968).
430. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
431. Id. at 363–64.
432. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
433. Id. at 525.
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persuasion on the prosecution, resulting in increased protection of the
defendant’s liberty.434 The Court then stated, “Due process commands
that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the
burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.”435 Although the
Court did not address allocating the burden of persuasion to prove an
affirmative defense, the concept is still relevant.
In Dixon v. United States, discussed at length in Part IV,436 Justice Breyer
wrote a dissent attacking the majority’s decision as rigid and formalistic.437
The Supreme Court’s majority decision in Dixon v. United States places the
burden of persuasion on the defendant when presenting a duress defense,
thereby requiring him to convince the jury that he was forced to
participate under threat of death or serious bodily harm.438 The court’s
majority opinion explicitly found that there is no constitutional
requirement that the burden of persuasion for a duress defense be
allocated to the defendant or the prosecution,439 and, as such, Congress
has the prerogative to legislatively allocate the burden where it sees fit.440
The majority decision then stated that because Congress had not exercised
its prerogative, it was up to the Court to “effectuate the affirmative
defense of duress as Congress ‘may have contemplated’ it . . . .”441 Citing
the “long-established common-law rule,” the majority held that defendants
are to bear the burden of proving duress defenses.442
In Justice Breyer’s vigorous and lengthy dissent, he argues that the
burden of persuasion pertaining to a duress defense should be borne by
the prosecution.443 Justice Breyer agrees with the majority that the
Constitution does not require that the burden of persuasion be allocated to
one party or the other, and that such may be allocated by Congress “as it

434. Id. at 525–26.
435. Id. at 526.
436. Supra, Part IV.
437. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 21 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To believe that
Congress intended the placement of such burdens to vary from statute to statute and time to time is
both unrealistic and risks unnecessary complexity, jury confusion, and unfairness.”).
438. Id. at 17.
439. Id. at 8.
440. Id. at 17.
441. Id. (quoting United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 us 483, 491 n.3
(2001)).
442. Id.
443. Id. at 21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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sees fit.”444 However, he argues that because there is no constitutional
requirement to allocate the burden, and because Congress is silent on the
issue (noting this is congressional norm), the Court is free to determine
which side should carry the burden.445 Justice Breyer argues that
congressional silence is an invitation for the Court to allocate the burdens
pertaining to affirmative defenses by “taking full account of the
subsequent need for that law to evolve through judicial practice informed
by reason and experience.”446 Justice Breyer asserts that, unlike the
majority, he does not believe that Congress intended the courts to apply a
one-size-fits-all determination of how the burden of persuasion should be
allocated.447 Justice Breyer’s statement aligns with the view that Congress
intended the courts to allocate the burden of persuasion, not in a blanket
fashion but, instead, always looking toward the protection of a defendant’s
liberty.
Justice Breyer continues his argument that the prosecution should bear
the burden of persuasion for a duress defense based on multiple reasons:
(1) the question of duress is similar to mens rea, which is always allocated to
the prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion; (2) in the past, federal
courts have allocated the burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses
(including duress) to the government; and (3) in order to prevent juror
confusion, the burden of persuasion for duress should be carried by the
government, thereby treating it the same the defenses of mens rea, actus reus,
mistake, and self-defense.448 Of these three reasons, the most compelling
argument the dissent offers—for the allocation of the burden of
persuasion for affirmative defenses on the government—is based on
precedent. The dissent notes that prior to the majority’s decision in Dixon,
most federal courts (for federal crimes) allocated the burden of persuasion

444. Id.
445. Id. at 21–22. The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that legislatures may
allocate the burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses. In Patterson v. New York, the Court held
that the New York statute that required the defendant to carry the burden of persuasion for a
common law heat of passion defense did not violate constitutional due process. Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977). The Court determined that legislatures have the prerogative to
allocate the burden of persuasion as long as the statute does not offend a fundamental principle of
justice. Id. at 201–02.
446. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 22. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
447. See id. (insisting that the determination should begin with common law and evolve
through reason and experience).
448. Id. at 22–29.
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to disprove a duress defense to the government.449 Similarly, in Mullaney
v. Wilbur, the United States Supreme Court also required that the
government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not act
in the heat of passion if the issue was presented.450 In the Court’s
decision, it noted that the practical effect of its holding was the same as
requiring the prosecution to disprove a defendant’s claim of selfdefense.451 While the Court’s holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur has never been
directly overruled, when viewed through the lens of Patterson v. New York,
the position that the government (as a matter of constitutional due
process) should carry the burden of persuasion for a duress defense is
diminished. The Patterson and Mullaney decisions do, however, determine
that the burden of persuasion for a duress defense is a matter of legislative
prerogative.452 As previously noted, Congress has not legislatively
allocated the burden of persuasion for a federal duress defense. This
brings the argument back to Justice Breyer’s main point: in the absence of
congressional allocation, the Court is free to determine which side should
carry the burden.453 Justice Breyer’s argument—that at one point most
federal courts required the government to carry the burden of

449. Id. at 24–27. Prior to the Dixon Court’s decision, most federal circuit courts placed the
burden on the government to disprove an affirmative defense. See United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d
444, 448 (1st Cir. 1996) (“When a predicate warranting a duress instruction has been laid, the
government is saddled with the additional burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant’s criminal acts were not the product of duress.”); United States v. Talbot, 78 F.3d 1183,
1186 (7th Cir. 1996) (asserting, unless a statute dictates otherwise, that “the burden of proof remains
on the government to negate beyond a reasonable doubt the affirmative defenses properly raised by
the defendant”); United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282, 1287 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding the
government responsible for disproving a defense beyond a reasonable doubt once a defendant meets
the burden of production for a coercion defense); United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469, 1477
(10th Cir. 1985) (“Coercion is an affirmative defense which the government must disprove beyond a
reasonable doubt only after the issue has been raised.”); United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 836
(2d Cir. 1983) (stating “general federal practice” requires the prosecution to disprove a duress
defense beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 1982)
(recognizing the prosecution must disprove coercion beyond a reasonable doubt if the defendant
meets the burden of production); Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150, 157 (8th Cir. 1961)
(determining the Government has the burden to prove all elements of the crime and, if the defendant
was coerced into committing the crime, then the criminal intent required to convict would be
insufficient).
450. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702–04 (1975).
451. Id. at 702.
452. See Dixon, 548 U.S. at 21 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where Congress speaks about burdens
of proof, we must, of course, follow what it says.”).
453. Id. at 22.
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persuasion—is a powerful argument that weighs in favor of the Court
allocating the burden of persuasion for defenses of duress.
Commentators have stated that theories of justification have evolved
over time and that today the theory requires the state to “justly punish only
those individuals whose violation of the law is morally blameworthy.”454
The majority’s rigid and formalistic decision in Dixon does not comport
with an “increased protection of a defendant’s liberty,” nor does it protect
an individual like Roberto that is arguably morally blameworthy. By
shifting the burden of persuasion to disprove a defendant’s duress defense
to the government, the margin of error will be reduced, resulting in an
increased protection of the defendant’s liberty.
2.

Allowing the Necessity Defense

When an individual is forced to participate in a crime by a cartel, courts
should allow a defense of necessity to be argued, thereby providing
another avenue of defense for the defendant. As previously discussed, the
court in United States v. Contento-Pachon denied the defendant’s use of a
necessity defense, thus limiting the defendant to a defense of duress.455
Citing the traditional definition of necessity as requiring the criminal acts
to be coerced by physical forces, the court found that the defendant could
not argue the necessity defense.456 The court, however, noted that
modern courts have blurred the distinction between necessity and
duress.457
In United States v. Bailey, the United States Supreme Court reinforced the
notion that modern cases have blurred the distinction between the
defenses of necessity and duress.458 The facts of the Bailey case indicate
that the defendants fled a prison because of the horrible conditions (i.e.,
beatings, lack of medical care, and sexual attacks) that they faced inside the
prison.459 The defendants attempted to argue both duress and necessity
at trial, but the judge denied the defenses because the defendants did not
immediately turn themselves in to authorities after they had escaped the

454. George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-Of-Persuasion
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 888 (1968).
455. United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984).
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980).
459. Id. at 398.
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prison.460 The appeals court reversed the trial court’s decision because
the defendants had not been allowed to argue duress and necessity.461
The Bailey Court, in its review of the appeals court’s decision, commented
that the lower court had “discarded the labels of ‘duress’ and ‘necessity’” in
its analysis of the defense.462 The Court noted that the appeals court had
instead focused on whether the defendants had been faced with a choice
of evils.463 The Court then stated that neither the duress nor the necessity
defense could be used “if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to
violating the law.”464 Consequently, the Court reversed the appeals
court’s decision because it determined that the defendants had not
adduced evidence to support the argument that escape was the only legal
alternative.465 The Court then observed that the focus of the appeals
court was not on whether the coercion was caused by a human or natural
force of nature, but rather on whether the defendants had been forced to
make a choice between evils.466 The Bailey Court had every opportunity
to disallow the defendants’ necessity argument based on lack of a “natural
force” requirement. The Court, however, refused to restrict the necessity
defense to the traditional definition, thereby implying that the necessity
defense would be available in a prison escape case.467 Justice Blackmun,
writing for the dissent, stated that the majority implicitly recognized that
duress and necessity were available as defenses for the crime of prison
escape.468 The Court failed to preclude the defendants in Bailey from
making a necessity defense even though they did not face a natural
force.469 The Bailey Court’s implicit recognition that a defendant could
460. Id. at 399–400.
461. Id. at 394.
462. Id. at 410.
463. See id. (describing the decisions of lower courts and the common law view of the
necessity defense as a “choice of evils” argument).
464. Id.
465. Id. at 417.
466. Id. at 410.
467. See id. at 409–14 (discussing the traditional definition of necessity as a defense and
analyzing the issue of escape from a prison where inmates are fleeing adverse additional conditions,
as opposed to the confinement itself).
468. See id. at 425 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court declines to address the
issue, it at least implies that it would recognize the common-law defenses of duress and necessity to
the federal crime of prison escape, if the appropriate prerequisites for assertion of either defense
were met.”).
469. See id. at 435 (“The case for recognizing the duress or necessity defenses is even more
compelling when it is society, rather than private actors, that creates the coercive conditions.”).
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utilize a necessity defense in the context of a prison escape lends support
to the argument that an individual being threatened by the cartels could
also make the same argument.470 Courts today should eschew the
traditional application of the necessity defense and embrace the Bailey
Court’s implicit recognition that a crime can be committed out of necessity
even if no forces of nature are present.
Broadening the scope of when the necessity defense would be
applicable provides the defendant with an additional avenue of defense
that may increase his chances of achieving a just result. Admittedly, this
change may not result in substantial benefits to a defendant; however,
proving the first element of necessity—as opposed to the first element of
duress—could provide enough of a nuance to allow the defendant to
succeed. An argument that the defendant committed the crime after
choosing the lesser of two evils is likely less burdensome to make than
proving the crime was committed due to imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury. As previously discussed in the case of Roberto, and
for defendants in similar circumstances, a defense of duress would require
proof that he was acting under threat of serious bodily injury or death;
whereas a necessity defense would allow an argument that he chose the
lesser of two evils (i.e. brought the drugs into the United States to save his
wife and child from dying). It is reasonable to acknowledge that a juror
would be more likely to find that Roberto chose the lesser of two evils.
An individual who commits a crime because he or his family will be
killed by the cartels has a similar or better “choice of evils” argument than
someone escaping prison to escape a beating or substandard medical care.
Courts should allow defendants who, like Roberto, are forced to commit
crimes out of necessity to use the defense of necessity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mexican Cartels have had an effect on the United States criminal justice
system for many years. The effect has become more substantial as the
cartels have transitioned from operating mainly inside of Mexico to
becoming transnational criminal organizations. As the TCOs have
become more powerful and more diverse, the United States criminal
justice system has become burdened with an overwhelming number of
cases and prisoners that are connected with the cartels. Defendants with
470. See id. at 412–13 (analyzing the necessity defense in the context of inmates escaping from
prison to avoid additional adverse conditions).
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cartel ties that are arrested and brought into the criminal justice system
have been shown to work voluntarily and, unfortunately, involuntarily for
the cartels. Since the inception of our nation, the United States criminal
justice system has evolved and continues to evolve in order to ensure that
each defendant’s life and liberty are protected. The system’s evolution also
serves to efficiently prosecute and punish defendants that break the laws
of the United States. Current law does not properly take into account the
extreme business model that the Mexican TCOs use to ensure that their
business is successful. Individuals that fall under the Plata o Plomo choice
are forced to choose between participating in crime or losing their life.
The current state of the law pertaining to duress and necessity needs to be
changed to ensure that each and every defendant’s liberty is protected and
justice is available for everyone. In 1868, the Supreme Court chose to use
“common sense” when implying a necessity argument. Federal courts
should now choose “common sense” in the application of duress and
necessity defenses for individuals that really have no choice at all.
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